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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Matthew K. Robison 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
June 2018 
 
Title: Regulating Mind-Wandering and Sustained Attention with Goal-Setting, Feedback, 
and Incentives 
 
 The present set of experiments investigated three potential means of regulating 
mind-wandering and sustained attention: goals, feedback, and incentives. The 
experiments drew up goal-setting theory from industrial/organizational psychology, 
theories of vigilance and sustained attention, and recent experimental work examining 
mind-wandering and sustained attention. Experiment 1 investigated the role of goal-
difficulty and goal-specificity. Providing a difficult goal for participants only improved 
sustained attention compared to a condition with no specific goal. Experiment 2 
investigated the role of feedback in isolation and in combination with goals. Feedback 
improved sustained attention and reduced mind-wandering, but it did so regardless of 
whether or not the feedback was tied to a specific goal. Experiment 3 investigated how 
two different incentives – money and early release from the experiment – affected 
sustained attention and mind-wandering. The incentives had no effect on task 
performance, but participants in the early release condition reported being more 
motivated, more alert, and mind-wandered less throughout the task. I discuss the results 
of the experiments in light of predictions made by goal-setting theory as well as theories 
of vigilance and sustained attention.  
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A burgeoning body of research has demonstrated that mind-wandering is a 
common mental state that is often associated with deficits in task performance (Callard, 
Smallwood, Golchert, & Margulis, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015). Mind-wandering can defined as any task-unrelated thought that is 
relatively independent of any immediate external stimulus. Prior research has 
demonstrated that mind-wandering is harmful for task performance on simple stimulus-
detection tasks (e.g., Antrobus, Greenberg, & Singer, 1966) as well as higher-level tasks 
like reading (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004), academic performance (Wammes, 
Seli, Cheyne, Boucher, & Smilek, 2016), and driving (Yanko & Spalek, 2014). 
Sometimes, mind-wandering can have serious consequences, such as driving accidents 
(Galéra et al., 2012) and catastrophic operator errors (Reason, 1990). Strategies for 
reducing mind-wandering could thus potentially improve academic outcomes, workplace 
productivity, and public safety. Therefore, recent research has attempted to reduce the 
frequency with which mind-wandering occurs (Sanders, Wang, Smallwood, & Schooler, 
2017; Seli, Schacter, Risko, & Smilek, in press; Xu, Purdon, Seli, & Smilek, 2017).  
 The proposed set of experiments will focus on mind-wandering in the context of 
sustained attention, which is the ability to maintain focus on a single task (or set of tasks) 
for a period of time. Performance on tasks requiring sustained attention typically 
deteriorates as a function of time. With time-on-task, behavioral performance decreases, 
self-reported alertness decreases, self-reported task engagement decreases, mind-
wandering increases, and physiological arousal decreases (Hopstaken, van der Linden, 
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Bakker, & Kompier, 2015a, 2015b; Hopstaken, van der Linden, Bakker, Kompier, & 
Leung, 2016; Mackworth, 1948; Parasuraman, 1977; Parasuraman & Davies, 1977; 
Unsworth & Robison, 2016, in press). This effect is commonly referred to as the 
vigilance decrement. Various hypotheses have been proposed for why this is the case (for 
recent reviews, see Fortenbaugh, DeGutis, & Esterman, 2017; Langner & Eickhoff, 2013; 
Thomson, Benser, & Smilek, 2015). Later, I will describe four theories of vigilance and 
sustained attention, and what specific predictions they would make for the present study.  
In my own work, I have been trying to understand what factors – both cognitive 
and conative – predict mind-wandering at the level of individual differences. 
Consistently, intrinsic self-reported motivation is one of the strongest predictors of both 
mind-wandering and task performance (Robison & Unsworth, 2015, 2018a, 2018b; Seli, 
Cheyne, Xu, Purdon, & Smilek, 2015; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). People who report 
higher levels of motivation report fewer instances of mind-wandering and demonstrate 
better task performance. And importantly, motivation is consistently uncorrelated with 
some cognitive abilities (e.g., working memory capacity), which also predict fewer 
instances of mind-wandering and better task performance (Robison & Unsworth, 2015, 
2018b; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). Further, several experiments have provided 
participants with motivational incentives to counteract time-on-task effects in sustained 
attention (Berghum & Lehr, 1964; Bevan & Turner, 1965; Brewer, Lau, Wingert, Ball, & 
Blais, 2017; Esterman, Reagan, Liu, Turner, & DeGutis, 2014; Esterman et al., 2016; 
Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Massar, Lim, Sasmita, & Chee, 2016; Seli et al., in 
press). These experiments have shown that providing a motivational incentive can restore 
task engagement, alertness, motivation, and performance, even after participants have 
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been completing the task for a long period of time. Thus, both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation seem to be important factors that affect task engagement and mind-wandering. 
Therefore, motivational manipulations provide a potentially fruitful avenue for improving 
task engagement and reducing mind-wandering. 
The present study uses an extended version of the psychomotor vigilance task 
(PVT; Dinges & Powell, 1985) to measure sustained attention. In this task, participants 
are given a series of trials for a period of time (about 30 min in the present study). On 
each trial, the task shows participants a row of blue zeros centered on the screen that look 
like a paused stopwatch (00.000). After a random interval between 2 and 10 s later, the 
stopwatchs “turns on” and the numbers start scrolling. The participant’s task is simple: 
press a key (the spacebar in the present study), as quickly as possible. After the 
participant presses the key, the reaction time for that trial remains on-screen for 1 s (e.g., 
00.378). The next trial then begins. The PVT is a useful task for several reasons. It is a 
simple reaction time task, so measures of behavioral performance are rather 
straightforward (i.e., mean reaction times, variability in reaction times, etc.) Because the 
dependent variable is so simple, participants can easily decipher how well (or poorly) 
they performed on a given trial, as they are given their reaction time for each trial. 
Despite its rather straightforward nature, it is difficult and rather monotonous, and 
performance typically wanes as a function of time, consistent with vigilance decrements 
in classic signal detection paradigms (e.g., Mackworth, 1948). Because we have used this 
extended version in previous research (Unsworth & Robison, 2016, in press), it is well-
characterized as far as behavioral performance, self-reports of mind-wandering, and 
pupillometry. 
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A separate yet related line of research in industrial/organizational psychology has 
focused on how motivational factors affect task performance in both laboratory and 
applied settings. One relevant theoretical approach is goal-setting theory. Locke and 
colleagues have argued that goal-setting is an important element of task performance 
(Locke, Cartledge, & Knerr, 1970; Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981; Locke & 
Latham, 2002). Commonly, people who are more intrinsically motivated report setting 
specific goals for themselves. Further, when people are given specific, difficult goals, 
they tend to perform better compared to when they are given no goals, vague goals (e.g., 
“do your best”), or easy goals (Locke & Latham, 2002). So, the incentivizing 
experiments mentioned earlier may be motivating participants not because they provide a 
reward, but because they give participants a specific goal toward which they can strive.  
Goal-setting theory posits four mechanisms by which goals can affect task 
performance (Locke & Latham, 2002). The first is that goals direct attention toward a 
specific task and away from any goal-irrelevant activities. From a sustained attention 
perspective, a goal would thus keep an individual focused on a task to avoid attending to 
either internal (e.g., mind-wandering about the upcoming weekend) or external (e.g., 
checking one’s watch or phone) sources of distraction. The second mechanism is an 
energizing function – they have more of an impact when the goal is difficult, as difficult 
goals require more effort. In sustained attention, the performance goal is usually rather 
straightforward (e.g., respond as quickly as possible on each trial, detect and respond to 
targets as accurately as possible). But there is rarely any specific standard the individual 
must meet. So providing such a standard might encourage people to put forth more effort 
toward performing well on the task. The third mechanism is persistence – goals 
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encourage people to maintain their effort on a task. Sustained attention notoriously 
worsens with time. Thus, goals might work to keep people more engaged with a sustained 
attention task for a longer period of time, perhaps mitigating the classic vigilance 
decrement. The fourth mechanism is strategic – goals encourage people to discover or 
develop strategies for more effective or efficient performance. In the current study, this 
might lead participants to pursue a specific strategy (e.g., stare as intently as possible at 
the zeros), or to try different strategies (e.g., use the thumb to press the spacebar, then try 
the index finger). Whatever these strategies may be, they all lead to more engagement 
with the task, which should improve performance. Goal-setting theory was originally 
developed to address performance in an applied/industrial setting. However, it may offer 
insights into specifically cognitive issues, especially sustained attention. Thus, the 
proposed set of experiments will combine work from industrial/organizational 
psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience to examine how goal 
setting can reduce mind-wandering and improve sustained attention.  
In addition to goal-setting, the present set of experiments also investigated how 
feedback, with and without a goal paired with it, affects sustained attention. A wealth of 
research has examined how feedback (sometimes called “knowledge-of-results” or 
“knowledge-of-score”) affects performance on a variety of tasks. Most relevant to the 
current study are experiments showing improvements to vigilance with feedback (Church 
& Camp, 1965; Johanson, 1922; Pollack & Knapf, 1958; Sipowicz, Ware, & Baker, 
1962; Warm, Epps, & Ferguson, 1974). With regard to goal-setting theory, some have 
argued that feedback is actually a necessary component of the effectiveness of goals 
(Erez, 1977; Locke, 1967, 1968; Locke & Bryan, 1968, 1969; Locke, Cartledge, & 
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Koppel, 1968). As an example, in an experiment examining performance on a simple 
clerical task, Erez (1977) manipulated the presence of performance feedback across 
conditions. In one condition, participants were given no information about their 
performance. In the experimental conditions, participants were given feedback that their 
performance was among the highest 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 90% of people. Goal-
setting was manipulated by instructing people to try and be one of the five above-
mentioned performance thresholds, or by giving no specific goal. Results demonstrated 
that feedback alone did not improve performance, nor did goal-setting. But when they 
were combined, participants outperformed those in control conditions. Thus feedback 
was a necessary, but not sufficient, means of improving performance on a fairly simple 
task. However, when examining vigilance specifically, Warm et al. (1974) found an 
effect of feedback on reaction times and reaction time variability, even when the 
feedback was false. Warm et al. argue that the effect of feedback is primarily 
motivational in nature. Therefore, in the context of sustained attention, feedback may be 
effective even when it is not tied to a specific standard. In the present investigation, I 
combined goal-setting and feedback to see how these aspects of sustained attention tasks 
might regulate task engagement in a way that improves performance and mitigates the 
effects of time. 
Finally, the present set of experiments investigated how incentives, in 
combination with goals, might affect sustained attention. Prior research on vigilance 
(Bergum & Lehr, 1964; Bevan & Turner, 1965), as well as more recent research 
leveraging techniques like EEG and pupillometry (Esterman et al., 2014, 2016; 
Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Massar et al., 2016; Seli et al., in press), have 
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shown that incentives can improve sustained attention, reduce mind-wandering, and 
potentially counteract the effects of mental fatigue. In regards to the present study, 
incentives should magnify the effects of goals by encouraging people to actually meet 
those goals. In the absence of any incentive or reward, goals set forth by someone else 
(e.g., an experimenter) may be rather useless. But by providing a reason to meet the goal 
laid forth for them, an incentive may make a goal more worthy of an individual’s 
attention. Therefore, the present study also investigates how two different types of 
incentives – cash and early release from an experiment – might enhance the effectiveness 
of a goal on sustained attention.  
In Figure 1, I have outlined an overarching framework for how goals would 
theoretically affect sustained attention. This framework is derived from Locke’s goal-
setting theory, prior experimental work examining the effects of incentives on task 
engagement, motivation, and alertness, as well as my own work examining mind-
wandering, sustained attention, and arousal (Esterman et al., 2014, 2016; Hopstaken et 
al., 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Unsworth & Robison, 2016). In this framework, goals affect task 
engagement, which in turn produces changes in arousal, effort, mind-wandering, 
motivation, and subjective alertness. All of these have downstream effects on task 
performance. Under the labels for arousal and effort, mind-wandering, motivation, and 
alertness, I have listed how I measured each of these variables. I used pre-trial pupil 
diameter and task-evoked pupillary responses to measure arousal and allocations of 
attentional effort. Previous research has demonstrated that task-evoked pupil responses 
are valid indicators of effort on a number of tasks, including memory and attention tasks 
(Alnaes et al., 2014; Beatty, 1982a, 1982b; Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000; Hess & 
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Polt, 1964; Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman & Beatty, 
1966; Massar et al., 2016; Unsworth & Robison, 2015, 2016, in press). Further, research 
has demonstrated that baseline pupil diameter can index arousal levels. Presumably, 
baseline pupil diameter measures tonic activity in the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine 
system, which regulates arousal (Morad, Lemberg, Yofe, & Dagan, 2000; Murphy, 
O’Connell, O’Sullivan, Robertson, & Balsters, 2014; Murphy, Robertson, Balsters, & 
O’Connell, 2011; Unsworth & Robison, 2016, in press). Thought probes measured mind-
wandering and other subjective attentional states, and self-reports at various points 
throughout the task assessed subjective levels of motivation and alertness. Finally, the 
dependent variable in regards to task performance was response time (RT: mean RTs, RT 
variability, RT distributions, and lapses: RTs > 500 ms; Lim & Dinges, 2008). In 
succession, Experiments 1, 2, and 3 examined how goal-difficulty and goal-specificity, 
feedback, and incentives moderate the effects of goals on sustained attention via these 
various theoretical mechanisms.  
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Figure 1. Framework for how goals affect task engagement and task performance via 
various psychological mechanisms.  
 
 In the present study, I also address several oft-cited explanations for decrements 
of sustained attention across time: resource theory, mindlessness theory, motivational 
control theory, and resource-control theory. Resource theory argues that vigilance and 
sustained attention require cognitive resources. Over time these resources become 
depleted, and this is what accounts for decrements in task performance and task 
engagement (Grier et al., 2003; Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008). As people try 
to exert attention to detect targets or respond quickly, the pool of resources they must 
draw upon to do so becomes smaller, and thus people cannot exert their attention as 
effectively. In the present study, resource theory would predict that alertness and effort 
would decrease across time, but any failure to exert attention fully to the task would be 
because participants physiologically cannot do so. As evidence for this account, resource 
theorists cite evidence from individual differences in cerebral flood flow and changes in 
cerebral flood flow across time during vigilance tasks (Matthews et al., 2010; Warm, 
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Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2009). Thus, resource theory would predict decreases in 
physiological indicators of arousal, decreases in subjective alertness, increases in 
unintentional mind-wandering, but no changes in motivation, commitment to a task goal, 
or intentional mind-wandering. Resource theory would also predict that providing more 
difficult goals would have no effect on performance, or even a negative effect, as more 
difficult tasks theoretically deplete resources more quickly than easier tasks (Caggiano & 
Parasuraman, 2004; Helton & Russell, 2011). And vice versa, an easy goal should 
produce mitigated effects of time on arousal, alertness, and performance.  
 Mindlessness theory argues that vigilance and sustained attention tasks are 
inherently monotonous and boring. Thus performance decrements occur not because 
sustained attention tasks are difficult, but because they are not engaging (Manly, 
Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & 
Yiend, 1997). Thus, as time progresses, people voluntarily disengage from the task 
because of understimulation. In the present study, mindlessness theory would predict that 
changes in task performance should be accompanied by decreases in motivation and 
increases in intentional mind-wandering, but no changes in unintentional mind-
wandering, which represent instances in which people are trying to maintain focus on the 
task, but cannot.  
 The motivational control theory takes into account the goals of the individual, the 
individual’s affective state, and their interaction (Hockey, 2011). Within this theory, 
individuals select a goal (e.g., pay attention to this task) amongst a set of competing goals 
(e.g., plan my weekend) and exert control to keep the selected goal active. During task 
completion, the cognitive system must continually keep the goal active to perform the 
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task well. If the individual is meeting the goal without sensing strain, they continue to 
maintain that level of effort and maintain the goal. If the individual is not meeting the 
goal – provided some implicit or explicit feedback – they can do one of two things: they 
can adjust their goal, or they can adjust their effort level. An increase in effort may 
produce strain and lead to mental fatigue, whereas maintaining or adjusting effort 
downward sacrifices task performance. The cost of the strain (i.e., fatigue) must be 
weighed against the outcome obtained by the exertion of such strain (i.e., some implicit 
or explicit reward). The individual can also adjust their goal. A downward adjustment in 
the goal can allow the individual to maintain or adjust effort downward while pursuing a 
new level of satisfactory task performance. Thus, during the completion of some 
sustained task, there is a consistent interaction between goal-selection, task performance, 
and effortful control. In the present study, the motivational control theory would predict 
that any conditions that increase motivation will change the pattern of performance across 
time. That is, conditions that promote motivation should lead to more sustained activation 
of the task goal and thus smaller changes to task performance. However, participants who 
have easier goals can more easily adapt their goal to changes in performance or task 
engagement (e.g., when it is quite vague), should show smaller changes in alertness 
across time, as they can more effectively shield themselves from mental fatigue. 
 Finally, the resource-control account of mind-wandering and sustained attention 
(Thomson et al., 2015) posits that resources do not become depleted across time, but 
rather the allocation of resources between task-focus and mind-wandering changes. In a 
sustained attention situation, people must exert executive control to prevent the 
occurrence of mind-wandering and maintain task focus. Mind-wandering often 
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constitutes thoughts about personal concerns or unresolved goals (Klinger, 1999, 2009). 
If the valence of these goals supersedes the valence of the task-goal, personal concerns 
(and thus mind-wandering) can capture attention (McVay & Kane, 2010). Executive 
control wanes across time because people either learn to allocate fewer resources to the 
task, or because they feel the “cost” of exerting such control is not worth any subjective 
“gains,” and thus more resources are allocated to mind-wandering. Therefore the 
resource-control account predicts an increase in mind-wandering across time, a decrease 
in motivation, and a decrease in effort. Thomson et al. (2015) make a specific prediction 
that early in the task, mind-wandering is unintentional, but that later in the task, as 
motivation decreases, mind-wandering becomes more intentional as people deliberately 
disengage from the task. Thus, the resource-control account predicts that intentional 
mind-wandering will increase at a faster rate than unintentional mind-wandering across 
time. Similar accounts propose that cognitive control and effort are allocated based on a 
tradeoff between task-based effort and other uses of mental energy (e.g., Boksem & 
Tops, 2008; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013). But because Thomson et al. 
(2015) specifically address the relationship between sustained attention and mind-
wandering, it is particularly relevant here. The four theories described above account for 
changes in performance across time (e.g., vigilance decrements) differently. This is an 
active debate, and in addition to testing potential means of reducing mind-wandering in 
the context of sustained attention, the results of the present study can test predictions 
made by these four respective theories. 
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Present study 
 The proposed experiments will use an extended version of the psychomotor 
vigilance task (PVT; Dinges & Powell, 1985) as a measure of sustained attention. The 
PVT is a simple reaction time task that requires participants to respond as quickly as 
possible to a visual stimulus. With time, PVT reaction times tend to increase and become 
more variable, and extremely long reaction times (i.e., lapses) become more likely. 
Further, mind-wandering is quite common on this task, and it also tends to increase with 
time (Unsworth & Robison, 2016). Finally, arousal (measured by pupil diameter) tends to 
decrease with time-on-task, and differences in momentary arousal are predictive of both 
behavioral performance and self-reported off-task subjective states (i.e., mind-wandering, 
mind-blanking; Massar et al., 2016; Unsworth & Robison, 2016, in press). The proposed 
experiments will apply goal-setting theory to the investigation of sustained attention and 
mind-wandering. If by providing participants with specific difficult goals, feedback, 
and/or incentives we can reduce mind-wandering and improve sustained attention, this 
will open doors for future research into applied settings such as the workplace, 
classrooms, and public safety.  
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1: GOAL-SETTING 
 The first experiment leveraged findings from industrial/organizational psychology 
(Locke & Latham, 2002) and cognitive psychology (Esterman et al., 2014; 2016; 
Hopstaken et al., 2015a; 2015b; 2016; Massar et al., 2016; Seli et al., in press) to 
investigate how arousal, subjective motivation and alertness, mind-wandering, and task 
performance change based on goal-setting. Goal-setting was manipulated across 
conditions with three different sets of instructions. In all conditions, participants 
completed a 30-min sustained attention task. In the control condition, participants were 
given rather standard instructions to respond as quickly as possible on each trial. In the 
hard-goal condition, participants were given a goal of keeping their average reaction time 
below 300 ms. Only about 10% of people met this performance threshold in our previous 
work, so that is why I chose this specific threshold (Unsworth & Robison, 2016). In the 
easy-goal condition, participants were given a goal of keeping their average reaction time 
below 800 ms. In our previous work (Unsworth & Robison, 2016, in press), average 
reaction times were around 350 ms, and the slowest participant had an average reaction 
time of 458 ms. So the difficult goal will be rather hard to achieve, and the easy goal will 
be trivial.  
In reference to the framework laid out in Figure 1, goal specificity and difficulty 
should moderate the overarching goal of responding quickly to the stimulus on every trial 
(Figure 2). The no-goal condition was the default situation in which participants are given 
a rather vague instruction to respond quickly. The difficult-goal condition provided a 
specific and rather challenging standard to which participants can compare their 
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performance. Finally, the easy-goal condition provided a specific goal, but the standard 
was a trivially easy one to meet. The easy-goal condition also provided a crucial 
comparison with which I could test whether providing any specific goal, regardless of 
difficulty, affected performance.  
 
Figure 2. Theoretical framework for how goal-specificity and goal-difficulty might 
moderate the effect of goals. 
 
Based on goal-setting theory and the framework proposed above, I hypothesized 
that, compared to the control condition, the difficult goal would do the following: 1) 
increase/stabilize arousal 2) increase task engagement such that average task-evoked 
pupillary responses would be larger and/or less variable, 3) increase task performance 
such that the RT distribution would shift and/or narrow, 4) increase subjective motivation 
and alertness, and 5) reduce self-reported instances of task disengagement (i.e., more on-
task reports and fewer mind-wandering) reports.) Also, I hypothesized that the easy-goal 
condition would not have these effects, and may even have had the opposite effect on 
each of the dependent variables.  
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Method 
Participants and procedure 
 A sample of 105 participants (N = 35 in each condition, M age = 19.14, 75 
females, 30 males) from the human subjects pool at the University of Oregon completed 
the study in exchange for partial course credit. Participants first completed informed 
consent and demographics forms. They were randomly assigned to a goal-setting 
condition and completed a 30-min version of the PVT. 
Task  
 PVT. The PVT is a measure of sustained attention (Dinges & Powell, 1985). Each 
trial began with a row of blue zeros centered on the screen with spaces for second and 
milliseconds (0.000). After a random interval ranging from 2 to 10 s in 500-ms intervals, 
the zeros began counting up in 17-ms intervals like a stopwatch. The participant’s task 
was to press the spacebar as quickly as possible when they noticed the numbers start 
counting. After the participant pressed the spacebar, their reaction time remained on-
screen in red font for 1 s (e.g., 00.378). A 500-ms blank screen separated each trial. Trials 
began with a 2-s fixation screen on which five fixation crosses were centered. This 
fixation screen served two purposes. First, it allowed the pupil to return to a baseline 
level before the subsequent trial. Second, it allowed me to measure trial-to-trial changes 
in arousal. Participants first completed 5 practice trials. Then, they received their 
condition’s specific goal instructions and completed 5 consecutive blocks of 28 trials.  
 Goal instructions. In the vague/no-goal condition, participants were told, 
“Previous research has shown that good performance on this task is a fast reaction time. 
So your goal should be to keep your average reaction time as low as possible.” In the 
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hard-goal condition, participants were told, “Previous research has shown that good 
performance on this task is a reaction time below 300 milliseconds. So your goal should 
be to keep your average reaction time below 300 milliseconds.” In the easy-goal 
condition, participants were told, “Previous research has shown that good performance on 
this task is a reaction time below 800 milliseconds. So your goal should be to keep your 
average reaction time below 800 milliseconds.” 
 Pupil data. A Tobii T300 eye-tracker continuously recorded pupil diameter from 
both eyes throughout the entire task at a sampling rate of 120 Hz, and I used the left pupil 
diameter for all analyses. Missing data due to blinks and off-screen fixations were 
excluded from the analyses. The primary dependent variables were pre-trial pupil 
diameter and task-evoked pupillary responses. Pre-trial pupil diameter was measured as 
the average pupil diameter during the 2-s inter-trial fixation screen. The task-evoked 
response was measured as a change from baseline (the last 200 ms of the pre-stimulus 
interval). The peak dilation on each trial was measured during the window from 500 to 
800 ms post-stimulus onset. Participants sat about 60 cm from the screen with their heads 
fixed in a chinrest. Each participant’s eyes were calibrated to the eye-tracker at the 
beginning of the experimental session. If calibration was poor, I re-calibrated until the 
eye-tracker properly tracked the participant’s eyes. 
 Self-reports. After each of the 5 blocks, participants rated their subjective 
alertness and motivation on a scale of 1 to 7. For the alertness reports, a statement 
appeared on the screen that said, “Please rate how alert you feel right now.” Below the 
statement were the numbers 1 to 7, equally spaced. Under the numbers 1 and 7, the 
anchors read, “not at all” and “very alert” respectively. For the motivation reports, a 
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statement appeared on the screen that said, “Please rate how motivated you feel right now 
to perform well on the task.” Below the statement were the numbers 1 to 7, equally 
spaced. Under the numbers 1 and 7, the anchors read “not at all” and “very motivated,” 
respectively. 
 Thought probes. Participants received 4 thought probes during each block of the 
task. (20 probes total). The probes asked participants, “What were you thinking about just 
before this screen appeared?” Response options included 1) I was totally focused on the 
task, 2) I was thinking about my performance on the task or how long it is taking, 3) I 
was distracted by sights/sounds in the room or by physical sensations (hungry/thirsty), 4) 
I was intentionally thinking about things unrelated to the task 5) I was unintentionally 
thinking about things unrelated to the task, and 6) My mind was blank. Response 1 was 
scored as on-task, response 2 as task-related interference, response 3 as external 
distraction, response 4 as intentional mind-wandering, response 5 as unintentional mind-
wandering, and response 6 as mind-blanking. During the introduction to the task, 
participants received specific instructions about these thought probes and how to 
categorize their thoughts. 
 Post-experiment questionnaire. At the end of the task, participants were given a 
sheet of paper with the question, “What was your goal on this task?” Participants wrote 
their response under the question. Participants were also asked, “Before you came to the 
lab for this study, had you heard anything (from classmates, friends, etc.) about this 
specific study?” Participants checked Yes or No, and if they had heard anything, they 
were asked to report what they knew coming into the lab.  
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Results 
Task performance 
 Unless otherwise noted, for this and all subsequent analyses, I analyzed the effects 
of time and condition on the dependent variables with 5 x 3 mixed ANOVAs with block 
(1 to 5) as a within-subjects factor and condition (no goal, hard goal, easy goal) as a 
between-subjects factor. Table 1 shows mean RTs by block for each goal-setting 
condition. First, I trimmed the RTs to avoid skew from extremely short and extremely 
long responses by eliminating any RT shorter than 200 ms or longer than 3000 ms. This 
procedure eliminated 41 total RTs across all participants. The analysis on mean RTs 
indicated a main effect of block (F(4, 408) = 29.15, p < .001, partial η2 = .22), such that 
RTs increased across time (linear effect: F(1, 102) = 36.13, p < .001, partial η2 = .22). 
However, there was no significant main effect of goal-setting condition (F(2, 102) = 1.83, 
p = .17, partial η2 = .04), nor was there a block x condition interaction (F(8, 408) = .58, p 
= .80, partial η2 = .01). Inspection of Table 1, however, does show that participants in the 
hard-goal condition had the lowest RTs, at least numerically. Because I had hypothesized 
that the hard-goal and no-goal conditions would differ, I specifically compared these 
conditions. This comparison did indeed indicate a small but significant difference in 
overall RTs between these conditions (t(68) = 2.23, p = .03). Examining the differences 
as a function of block did not reveal a block x condition interaction (F(4, 272) = 1.74, p = 
.14, partial η2 = .03). So there is some evidence that providing a difficult goal did 
improve task performance by reducing RTs overall, but not significantly more than 
providing any specific goal.  
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Table 1 
 
Mean reaction times by block and goal-setting condition in Experiment 1 
 
 
    Condition     
          
 
Block  No goal Hard goal Easy goal Overall 
 
 
1  368 (42) 353 (38) 363 (33) 362 (38) 
2  384 (55) 363 (44) 381 (49) 376 (50) 
3  401 (51) 374 (50) 396 (70) 390 (62) 
4  430 (88) 395 (64) 417 (133) 414 (100) 
5  441 (94) 396 (68) 425 (151) 421 (111) 
Overall 405 (59) 376 (47) 397 (82) 393 (65) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Table 2 shows RT variability1 by block for each condition. There was a main 
effect of block on RT variability (F(4, 408) = 9.28, p < .001, partial η2 = .08), such that 
RTs became more variable across time (linear effect: F(1, 102) = 22.62, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .18). However there was no main effect of condition (F(2, 102) = .29, p = .75, partial 
η2 = .01), nor a block x condition interaction (F(8, 408) = 1.04, p = .40, partial η2 = .02). 
So although participants in all three conditions showed an increase in RT variability as a 
function of time, the goal-setting manipulations did not moderate these effects.  
  
                                                 
1 Variability was measured as the coefficient of variation within each block (standard deviation/mean). 
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Table 2 
 
Reaction time variability by block and condition in Experiment 1 
 
 
    Condition 
          
 
Block  No goal Hard goal Easy goal Overall 
 
 
1  .16 (.06) .18 (.10) .15 (.04) .16 (.07) 
2  .17 (.07) .19 (.14) .18 (.06) .18 (.10) 
3  .19 (.13) .17 (.08) .18 (.09) .18 (.10) 
4  .22 (.13) .22 (.13) .18 (.09) .21 (.14) 
5  .26 (.17) .22 (.14) .22 (.12) .23 (.15) 
Overall .20 (.10) .19 (.09) .19 (.06) .19 (.08) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
As a final step, I analyzed RTs in two additional ways. In the first, I examined the 
distribution of RTs across conditions. To do so, I rank-ordered each individual’s RTs and 
averaged them into quintiles. Thus, each participant had an average value of their fastest 
20% of responses to their slowest 20% of responses. It is possible that although the goal-
setting instructions did not improve reaction times overall, the goal may have reduced the 
skew of the RT distributions. If this was the case, I should observe a significant 
difference in the slowest 20% of RTs across conditions. However, a 5 x 3 mixed 
ANOVA with bin as a within-subjects factor and condition as a between-subjects factor 
did not reveal a main effect of condition (F(2, 102) = 1.91, p = .15, partial η2 = .04) or a 
bin x condition interaction (F(2, 102) = .36, p = .70, partial η2 = .01). Table 3 shows these 
data. Specifically comparing the hard-goal and no-goal conditions revealed significant 
differences in all bins (ps < .03) except bin 5 (p = .14), likely due to the fact that bin 5 
had the most between- and within-subject variability.  
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Table 3 
 
Reaction time distributions by condition in Experiment 1 
 
 
    Condition 
            
  
 
Bin  No goal Hard goal Easy goal 
 
 
1  318 (31) 301 (21) 313 (27) 
2  353 (40) 331 (29) 346 (36) 
3  383 (50) 356 (36) 373 (44) 
4  420 (62) 389 (49) 414 (79) 
5  551 (151) 504 (114) 533 (226) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Finally, I examined the frequency of “lapse” trials (RTs > 500 ms) across time 
and conditions. I summed how often participants encountered such trials within each 
block and examined such trials across conditions. Table 4 shows these data. The analysis 
indicated a significant main effect of block (F(4, 408) = 29.21, p < .001, partial η2 = .22), 
such that lapse trials became more common across time (linear effect: F(1, 102) = 50.67, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .33), but there was no main effect of condition (F(2, 102) = 2.00, p 
= .14, partial η2 = .04), nor a block x condition interaction (F(8, 408) = 1.66, p = .11, 
partial η2 = .03). So although lapse trials became more common across time, this effect 
did not differ significantly differ across conditions. However, comparing the hard-goal 
and no-goal conditions did reveal a marginal difference in the total number of lapses. 
Overall, participants in the hard-goal condition (M = 10.74, SD = 10.79) experienced 
slightly fewer lapses than participants in the no-goal condition (M = 18.17, SD = 19.42, 
t(68) = 1.98, p = .05).   
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Table 4 
 
Lapses by block and condition in Experiment 1 
 
 
 
    Condition 
 
 
Block  No goal Hard goal Easy goal 
 
 
1  1.46 (1.93) 1.26 (1.91) 1.57 (1.85) 
2  2.49 (3.51) 1.23 (1.94) 2.29 (3.04) 
3  3.42 (3.98) 2.03 (2.31) 2.83 (3.58) 
4  5.00 (6.01) 3.00 (3.48) 3.43 (4.25) 
5  5.60 (6.11) 3.23 (3.33) 3.86 (4.43) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
Motivation and alertness ratings 
 My next set of analyses focused on subjective reports of motivation and alertness 
as a function of time and condition. The analysis on motivation indicated a significant 
main effect of block (F(4, 408) = 50.76, p < .001, partial η2 = .33), such that motivation 
ratings decreased across time (linear effect: F(1, 102) = 93.16, p < .001, partial η2 = .48). 
However there was no main effect of condition (F(2, 102) = .04), nor a block x condition 
interaction (F(8, 408) = .48, p = .97, partial η2 = .01). So although participants in all three 
conditions reported decreases in motivation as they spent more time on the task, this 
pattern did not differ across conditions, and no condition reported higher motivation 
ratings overall. Figure 3 shows these data. 
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Figure 3. Motivation ratings by block and condition in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 
+/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
The analysis on alertness ratings indicated a significant main effect of block (F(4, 
408) = 65.55, p < .001, partial η2 = .39), such that subjective alertness decreased across 
time (linear effect: F(1, 102) = 152.84, p < .001, partial η2 = .60). However there was no 
main effect of condition (F(2, 102) = .06, p = .94, partial η2 = .001), nor a block x 
condition interaction (F(8, 408) = 1.40, p = .20, partial η2 = .03). So although alertness 
ratings dropped over time, this effect did not differ across conditions, and no group 
reported higher alertness ratings overall. Figure 4 shows these data. 
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Figure 4. Alertness ratings by block and condition in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 
+/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Thought probes 
 My next set of analyses examined responses to the thought probes. First I 
computed proportions of each thought probe response for each block for each participant. 
As a reminder, I hypothesized that participants in the hard goal condition would show 
less mind-wandering than participants in the other two conditions. To test this hypothesis, 
I entered mind-wandering responses into a 2 x 5 x 3 mixed ANOVA with within-subject 
factors of intention (intentional, unintentional) and block and a between-subjects factor of 
condition. The ANOVA indicated a main effect of intention (F(1, 102) = 72.72, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .42), such that unintentional mind-wandering was more common than 
intentional mind-wandering, a main effect of block (F(4, 408) = 25.52, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .10), such that mind-wandering became more common across time, and a block x 
intention interaction (F(4, 408) = 4.68, p < .001, partial η2 = .04), such that unintentional 
mind-wandering increased at a greater rate than intentional mind-wandering. Simple-
effects analysis indicated that both intentional mind-wandering (linear effect: F(1, 104) = 
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9.32, p = .003, partial η2 = .08) and unintentional mind-wandering (linear effect: F(1, 
104) = 39.39, p < .001, partial η2 = .28) increased across time. However, there was no 
main effect of goal-setting condition on mind-wandering reports (F(2, 102) = .40, p = .67, 
partial η2 = .01), no block x condition interaction (F(8, 408) = 1.34, p = .22, partial η2 = 
.03), no intention x condition interaction (F(2, 102) = 1.83, p = .17, partial η2 = .04), and 
no block x intention x condition interaction (F(8, 408) = 1.49, p = .17, η2 = .03). There 
was also a main effect on on-task reports (F(4, 408) = 10.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .09), 
which decreased across time (linear effect: F(1, 102) = 28.75, p < .001, partial η2 = .09). 
However there was no main effect of condition on on-task reports (F(2, 102) = .002, p = 
.99, partial η2 < .001). Thus, the goal-setting manipulation did not have any appreciable 
effect on mind-wandering nor its pattern of occurrence across time. The block x intention 
interaction is plotted in Figure 5. Table 5 shows proportions for all thought-probe 
response options by condition, collapsed across blocks. 
 
Figure 5. Intentional and unintentional mind-wandering (MW) by block in Experiment 1. 
Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
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Table 5 
 
Thought probe response proportions by condition in Experiment 1 
 
 
Condition 
            
 
Response    No goal Hard goal Easy goal 
 
On-task    .18 (.19) .17 (.16) .18 (.16) 
Task-related interference  .28 (.17) .29 (.16) .27 (.16)   
External distraction   .08 (.10) .11 (.14) .08 (.10) 
Intentional mind-wandering  .06 (.07) .10 (.14) .06 (.09) 
Unintentional mind-wandering .30 (.21) .24 (.20) .31 (.18) 
Mind-blanking   .11 (.12) .09 (.16) .09 (.10) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Pupillometry 
 In addition to measuring task performance (i.e., reaction times), self-reports of 
motivation and alertness, and self-reports of attentional states throughout the task, I also 
continuously measured pupil diameter to index 1) changes in arousal across time, and 2) 
effortful allocation of attention to the task. I measured arousal on a trial-by-trial basis by 
averaging pupil diameter across the 2-s pre-trial fixation screen. I then averaged these 
measurements within each block for each individual. I also computed variability in 
arousal by measuring the coefficient of variation of pre-trial pupil diameter within each 
block. Variability in pre-trial pupil diameter would be indicative of fluctuations in 
arousal.  
 Presumably, pre-trial pupil diameter measures moment-to-moment global arousal 
levels (Morad et al., 2000; Murphy et al., 2011, 2014; Unsworth & Robison, 2016, in 
press). The analysis on mean pre-trial pupil diameter indicated a significant main effect 
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of block (F(4, 408) = 28.99, p < .001, partial η2 = .22), but no effect of condition (F(2, 
102) = .84, p = .43, partial η2 = .02) nor a block x condition interaction (F(8, 408) = 1.36, 
p = .21, partial η2 = .03). So although arousal decreased across time (linear effect: F(1, 
102) = 39.68, p < .001, partial η2 = .28), this effect did not differ across conditions, nor 
did the goal-setting instructions have a global effect on arousal. Figure 6 shows this 
pattern.  
 
Figure 6. Pre-trial pupil diameter by block and condition in Experiment 1. Error bars 
represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Next I submitted variability in pre-trial pupil diameter to the same analysis. There 
was a significant main effect of block (F(4, 404) = 10.58, p < .001, partial η2 = .10), such 
that pre-trial pupil diameter became more variable across time (linear effect: F(1, 101) = 
35.83, p < .001, partial η2 = .26), but no main effect of condition (F(2, 101) = .03, p = 
.97, partial η2 = .001), nor a block x condition interaction (F(8, 404) = 1.24, p = .27, 
partial η2 = .02).2 So although pre-trial pupil diameter became more variable on a trial-to-
                                                 
2 The degrees of freedom for this test were slightly different than previous analyses, as one participant did 
not have enough valid pupil data in block 5 to compute variability within that block. 
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trial basis as a function of time, indicating more fluctuations in arousal, this effect did not 
differ across conditions, and no group showed significantly more variability overall. 
Figure 7 shows these data. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Variability in pre-trial pupil diameter by block and condition in Experiment 1. 
Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
 The next set of analyses focused on task-evoked pupillary responses. These 
responses were baseline-corrected on a trial-by-trial basis. For each trial, I averaged pupil 
diameter over the final 200 ms of the pre-stimulus interval. I then averaged post-stimulus 
pupil diameter into a series of 20-ms bins over the post-stimulus interval and subtracted 
the baseline measurement from each of these values. The resulting waveforms are plotted 
as a function of block in Figure 8. Consistent with prior work (Unsworth & Robison, 
2016), task-evoked responses decreased across time (F(4, 412) = 10.31, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .09). 
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Figure 8. Task-evoked pupillary responses by block in Experiment 1. 
Presumably, the task-evoked response measures the deployment of attentional 
effort on each trial (Alnaes, 2014; Beatty, 1982a, 1982b; Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 
2000; Hess & Polt, 1964; Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Kahneman, 1973; 
Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Massar et al., 2016; Unsworth & Robison, 2015, 2016, in 
press). To statistically compare task-evoked responses across block and condition, I 
computed the peak response over the interval from 500 – 800 ms post stimulus onset for 
each trial for each individual. I then averaged these peak responses within each block for 
each participant. The analysis indicated a significant main effect of block (F(4, 408) = 
31.35, p < .001, partial η2 = .24), such that the average maximum task-evoked response 
decreased across time (linear effect: F(1, 102) = 81.30, p < .001, partial η2 = .44), but no 
effect of condition (F(2, 102) = .13, p = .88, partial η2 = .003), nor a block x condition 
interaction (F(8, 408) = 1.03, p = .41, partial η2 = .02). So although task-evoked 
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responses decreased across time, this effect did not differ across conditions, and no 
condition showed greater task-evoked responses overall. Figure 9 shows this pattern. 
 
 
Figure 9. Maximum task-evoked pupillary responses by block and condition in 
Experiment 1. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Post-experiment questionnaire 
After completing the task, participants responded to the question, “What was your 
goal on this task?” by writing their response on a sheet of paper. I recorded these 
responses verbatim and counted how often participants mentioned a specific goal (e.g., 
keeping their average reaction time below 300 ms) and how often this goal matched their 
experimental condition assignment. Only 9 of 35 participants (26%) in the hard goal 
condition mentioned the goal of keeping their reaction time below 300 ms, and only 1 out 
of 35 participants in the easy goal condition (3%) mentioned the goal of keeping their 
reaction time below 800 ms. No participants in the no-goal condition mentioned a 
specific goal other than trying to respond quickly. Therefore, these goals may not have 
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been internalized by the majority of participants. This is something that will be addressed 
in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, I investigated the effects of goal-setting and goal difficulty on 
sustained attention. In one condition, participants received standard instructions to be as 
fast as possible on each trial (no goal). In a second condition, participants received 
instructions to try to keep their average reaction time below 300 ms (hard goal). In a third 
condition, participants received instructions to try to keep their average reaction time 
below 800 ms (easy goal). I had hypothesized that participants in the hard goal condition 
would show better task performance (faster and less variable RTs), less mind-wandering, 
higher motivation and alertness, and that these findings would be corroborated by 
pupillometric indicators of arousal and effort. However, these hypotheses were not 
supported by the data. Consistent with prior research on this task, participants 
demonstrated a gradual decline in task performance (RTs became longer and more 
variable), an increase in mind-wandering, decreases in motivation and alertness, and 
decreases in pupillary measures of arousal and effort. Many of the group comparisons 
found no differences. Participants in all three conditions showed roughly equal 
motivation, alertness, arousal, effort, and mind-wandering across time. Consistent with 
my hypothesis, participants in the hard-goal condition did show better task performance 
(i.e., faster RTs) than participants in the no-goal condition. However, the difference 
between these groups was quite small.   
There are several possible reasons for why few group differences arose as a result 
of varying task instructions. The first is that participants received no feedback as to how 
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they were or were not meeting the goal set forth for them. Although they received their 
reaction time on each individual trial, and thus had some general idea of their average 
performance, they did not know specifically whether they were at or below the target. 
Therefore, it may have been difficult for participants, especially in the hard goal 
condition, to adjust their effort to meet the task goal. Experiment 2 directly addresses the 
role of feedback in combination with goal-setting. A second possibility is that there was 
no incentive to meet the goal laid out for them by the experimenter. Therefore, 
participants may not have felt the additional effort required to meet the goal was worth it. 
Experiment 3 directly addresses the role of incentives in combination with goals. A third 
possibility is that the hard goal was actually too hard to meet. So participants down-
adjusted their effort to pursue some more general goal (e.g., be as fast as possible) or 
another specific goal (e.g., try to stay under 500 ms on each trial). The post-experimental 
questionnaires indicated that the majority of participants, even in the hard and easy goal 
conditions, reported that their goal was simply to be as fast as possible. A final possibility 
is that resource depletion does not allow people, regardless of their goals, to overcome 
the costs of repeated deployment of attention. Although people might try to maintain a 
certain level of performance, the depletion of some cognitive resource prevents them 
from sustaining their attention. But if this is the case, I should have seen an effect of a 
goal very early on (e.g., during block 1) before resource depletion occurred.  
Although group differences did not arise for most dependent variables, 
participants in all three conditions showed remarkably consistent effects of time on nearly 
all the dependent variables. As time progressed, RTs became slower and more variable, 
lapses (RTs longer than 500 ms) became more common, participants reported more 
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mind-wandering (especially unintentional mind-wandering), self-reported motivation and 
alertness decreased, pre-trial pupil diameter decreased and became more variable 
(indicating reductions in arousal and more fluctuations in arousal), and task-evoked pupil 
responses decreased (indicating reductions in task-based effort on each trial). These 
results are consistent with prior work using the PVT and other sustained attention tasks 
(Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Massar et al., 2016; Unsworth & Robison, 2016).  
Whether the effects of time on the dependent variables were due to a reduction in 
some cognitive resource that becomes depleted across time, mindlessness, or dynamic 
adjustments in effort, is still not entirely clear. On one hand, it appears as if the 
participants were losing mental energy across time: they report decreases in alertness, and 
these reports are corroborated by reductions in arousal across time. Further, participants 
also reported increases in unintentional mind-wandering. Together these findings support 
the idea that participants are trying to sustain their attention to the task, but can’t, which 
would be predicted by a resource account (Grier et al., 2003; Warm et al., 2008). 
However, a resource-account would make the prediction that participants in the hard-goal 
condition would show even greater effects of time on task performance and motivation. 
Even though the external stimulation was identical across conditions, presumably 
pursuing a more difficult goal is more mentally taxing than pursuing a vague or easy 
goal. From the opposite direction, the easy-goal condition should have showed less of a 
change in arousal and alertness across time. But clearly neither were the case.  
Participants also reported decreases in motivation and increases in intentional 
mind-wandering. These results support the idea that participants are choosing to reduce 
their effort as time progresses, which is more consistent with the mindlessness, 
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motivational control, and resource-control theories (Hockey, 2011; Robertson et al., 
1997; Thomson et al., 2015). However, these theories would predict that intentional 
mind-wandering would increase at a much faster rate than unintentional mind-wandering, 
as any adjustment in effort or resource-allocation would be under the control of the 
participant. The opposite was true. Although both types of mind-wandering increased 
across time, unintentional mind-wandering increased at a significantly faster rate than 
intentional mind-wandering. So Experiment 1 cannot unequivocally distinguish between 
vigilance decrements being due to resource depletion, volitional shifts in effort/resource-
allocation, or a combination of both. Clearly some sort of mental fatigue is occurring, and 
performance is dropping as a result. However, the changes in performance across time 
were neither entirely due to a voluntary disengagement from the task nor a depletion of 
resources that prevented effective allocation of attention.  
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 2: GOAL-SETTING AND FEEDBACK 
One element of goal-setting interventions is that there is typically either implicit or 
explicit feedback about one’s performance on their task. Depending on the availability 
and salience of feedback, this information can moderate the effect of a goal (Locke & 
Latham, 2002). In the typical PVT, the participant’s reaction time remains on-screen for 1 
s. So on every trial, participants know how quickly they responded. However, a naïve 
participant is likely unaware of what constitutes a fast or slow reaction time. Further, they 
probably cannot sense that their reaction times are getting slower. Vigilance decrements 
in the PVT are on the magnitude of 40 – 50 ms. So other than extremely slow reaction 
times, participants are probably unaware of how their performance is changing over time, 
or of how it compares to typical performance. Therefore, in this context, feedback alone 
might have an effect on motivation, arousal, and task engagement (McCormack, 1959; 
Church & Camp, 1970). However Locke and colleagues have argued that feedback is 
only useful insofar as it provides some information as to how a person is meeting (or 
failing to meet) a performance standard (Locke et al., 1981; Locke & Latham, 2002). 
Thus, feedback might only affect performance when it is paired with a goal. Further, the 
feedback might provide a crucial means of adjusting behavior in pursuit of a goal (Erez, 
1977; Sipowicz et al., 1962). If a person has a specific goal but does not know how well 
they are keeping pace with such a goal, the goal standard may be virtually useless. But if 
the participant is given specific feedback on how their performance is meeting (or falling 
short of) the goal, the participant may be better able to regulate their attention and task 
engagement in pursuit of that goal (Bandura & Cervone, 1983).  
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 Experiment 2 examined the effect of feedback on its own, as well as its potential 
interactive effect with goal-setting. Goals and feedback were manipulated across 
conditions in a 2 x 2 design. In the no-feedback conditions, feedback was nearly 
eliminated. The 1-s feedback screen following each trial was replaced with a mask, and 
between blocks participants were told that the current block had ended and the next block 
was about to begin. In the feedback conditions, participants received the standard 1-s 
feedback screen on every trial. Plus, at the end of each block of trials, they saw their 
average reaction time for that block, as well as their average reaction time for the entire 
experiment. This feedback provided participants information on how their performance is 
changing over time, which theoretically would allow them to adjust their behavior. In the 
goal conditions, participants will be given a specific, difficult goal (keep their average 
reaction time below 300 ms). Thus, participants in the goal + feedback condition were 
able to compare their current level of performance to a standard and adjust their behavior 
accordingly. Similar to Experiment 1, participants in all conditions were asked about their 
current level of motivation and alertness following each block of trials (before they 
received feedback about their performance on that block).  
 In regards to the framework, feedback would theoretically moderate the effect of 
a goals on task engagement and task performance (Figure 3). On one hand, if people have 
a goal to meet, but have no information as to how they are progressing toward or meeting 
the goal, the goal may have limited effectiveness. On the other hand, feedback may 
provide people with the necessary information they need to regulate their behavior in 
pursuit of the goal (Erez, 1977; Payne & Hauty, 1955; Strang et al. 1974). If they know 
their current level of performance is below the standard, they may be able to adjust their 
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task engagement or effort level in order to reduce the gap between their current 
performance and their desired performance. However, we must also recognize that 
feedback in and of itself may have a moderating effect on task engagement (Church & 
Camp, 1965; Pollack & Knapf, 1958; Warm et al., 1974). In a typical sustained attention 
task, people may not be aware that their performance has started to slip. But once given 
information that shows their performance is worsening, people may adjust their task 
engagement to counteract such effects. So in Experiment 2, we provided conditions that 
have no feedback and no goal, feedback with no goal, and feedback plus a difficult goal.  
 
Figure 10. Theoretical framework for how feedback might moderate the effect of goals. 
 
 I hypothesized that feedback would exert a regulating role task engagement and 
interact with goal-setting. Specifically, I hypothesized that reaction times would be faster 
and/or less variable, mind-wandering would decrease, and arousal would stabilize when 
participants were given feedback. Further, I expected the effect of feedback to be greater 
when participants were given a specific, difficult goal. I also expected the complete 
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absence of feedback to have the opposite effect. That is, I expected task performance to 
be worse in the complete absence of explicit feedback on a trial-to-trial basis. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
 A sample of 144 participants from the human subjects pool at the University of 
Oregon completed the study in exchange for partial course credit. Three participants 
misunderstood the task instructions – they thought the goal was to keep their average RT 
below 30 s as opposed to 300 ms, 1 participant fell asleep during the task, and 1 
participant had heard about the study before coming to the lab. These participants were 
excluded from the final analyses, leaving a final sample of 139 participants (goal + 
feedback condition: N = 35; goal + no feedback: N = 35; no goal + feedback: N = 35, no 
goal + no feedback: N = 34; M age = 19.61, 86 females, 49 males, 1 non-binary gender). 
Participants completed informed consent and demographics forms. They were then 
randomly assigned to a feedback condition and completed the PVT. A Tobii T300 eye-
tracker continuously recorded eye data at a sampling rate of 120 Hz. 
 PVT. The task was nearly identical to that used in Experiment 1 with the 
exception that feedback screens were added between blocks, and trial-by-trial feedback 
was altered in the no-feedback conditions. In lieu of a feedback screen, the no-feedback 
conditions showed a screen telling participants that the current block of trials had ended, 
and that the next block would begin shortly. In all conditions, the block-by-block 
feedback screens appeared and remained on-screen for 8 s. Participants completed 5 
consecutive blocks of 28 trials. 
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 Goal instructions and feedback. Goals and feedback were fully crossed between 
conditions in a 2 x 2 design. In the goal + feedback condition, participants were told, 
“Previous research suggests that good performance on this task is a reaction time below 
300 milliseconds. Therefore, your goal on this task will be to keep your average reaction 
time below 300 milliseconds. After each block of trials, you will see a screen with your 
average reaction time for that block and your average reaction time overall.” The 
feedback screens between each block told participants, “Your average reaction time for 
that block was ___ milliseconds. Your average reaction time for the task is ___ 
milliseconds.” If a participant’s average reaction time was below 300 ms, the feedback 
screen also said, “You are currently on pace to meet the goal, keep it up!” If their average 
reaction time was above 300 ms, the feedback screen said, “You are not currently on pace 
to meet the goal, try to respond faster!” In the no-goal + feedback condition, participants 
were told to respond as quickly as possible on each trial. Between each block, these 
participants received their average reaction time for the preceding block and for the task 
overall. In the goal + no-feedback condition, participants were given the goal of keeping 
their average reaction time below 300 ms, but the feedback screens told them, “That is 
the end of this block of trials. The next block is about to begin,” and the 1-s post-trial 
feedback screen was be replaced with a mask (“XX.XXX” in red font). In the no-goal + 
no-feedback condition, participants were told to respond as quickly as possible. The 
feedback screens said, “That is the end of this block of trials. The next block is about to 
begin,” and the 1-s post-trial feedback screen was replaced by the mask. 
 Self-reports. See Experiment 1. 
 Thought probes. See Experiment 1. 
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 Post-experiment questionnaire. See Experiment 1. 
Results 
Task performance 
 Trimming and averaging procedures for RTs were identical to Experiment 1. 
Table 6 shows mean RTs by block for each condition. For this and all subsequent 
analyses, unless otherwise noted, I submitted the data to 5 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVAs with a 
within-subject factor of block and between-subjects factors of goal (goal, no goal) and 
feedback (feedback, no feedback). The analysis on RTs indicated a main effect of block 
(F(4, 540) = 41.40, p < .001, partial η2 = .24), such that RTs increased across time (linear 
effect: F(1, 135) = 70.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .34). The analysis also indicated a main 
effect of feedback (F(1, 135) = 5.15, p = .03, partial η2 = .04), such that participants who 
received feedback performed better overall. However there was no main effect of goal-
setting (F(1, 135) = .94, p = .33, partial η2 = .01), nor a goal-setting x feedback 
interaction (F(1, 135) = 0.11, p = .74, partial η2 = .001). Further the effect of block did 
not interact with goal-setting (F(4, 540) = .86, p = .49, partial η2 = .01) or feedback (F(4, 
540) = .89, p = .47, partial η2 = .01), and there was no block x goal x feedback interaction 
(F(4, 540) = 1.79, p = .13, partial η2 = .01).  
 Although the three-way interaction was not significant, I examined the effect of 
feedback separately in the goal and no-goal conditions. In the goal conditions, a 2 
(feedback, no feedback) x 5 (block) ANOVA, the main effect of feedback is not 
significant (F(1, 68) = 3.51, p = .065, partial η2 = .05), but there is a block x feedback 
interaction (F(4, 272) = 2.69, p < .03, η2 = .04). Further breakdown of conditions shows 
that RTs showed a steeper effect of time in the no-goal + feedback condition (linear 
42 
 
effect: F(1, 34) = 18.01, p < .001, partial η2 = .35) than in the goal + feedback condition 
(linear effect: F(1, 34) = 10.24, p = .003, partial η2 = .23). In the no-goal conditions, the 
main effect of feedback was not significant (F(1, 67) = 1.81, p = .18, partial η2 = .03), 
and there was no block x feedback interaction (F(4, 268) = .31, p = .87, partial η2 = .01). 
Breaking down the conditions further showed that participants in the no-goal + feedback 
condition (linear effect: F(1, 34) = 21.11, p < .001, partial η2 = .38) and participants in 
the no-goal + no-feedback condition (linear effect: F(1, 34) = 21.32, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.39) showed about the same effects of time on RTs. In all conditions, participants’ RTs 
showed significant slowing as time progressed. However this effect was shallowest when 
participants were given a goal and feedback, which is consistent with my hypothesis 
about the moderating effect of feedback on goal-setting. However the evidence for this 
interaction is quite weak, and the hypothesized three-way interaction among goal-setting, 
feedback, and block was not significant. 
 Table 7 shows data for RT variability as a function of block and condition. The 
analysis on RT variability indicated a linear main effect of block (F(4, 540) = 5.99, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .04), such that RT variability increased across time (linear effect: F(1, 
135) = 14.54, p < .001, partial η2 = .10). There were no main effects of goal-setting (F(1, 
135) = .67, p = .41, partial η2 = .01) or feedback (F(1, 135) = 2.32, p = .13, partial η2 = 
.02), no goal-setting x feedback interaction (F(1, 135) = .51, p = .48, partial η2 = .004), 
and no three-way interaction among block, goal-setting, and feedback (F(4, 540) = 1.87, 
p = .11, partial η2 = .01). So although feedback reduced RTs, it did not make RTs more 
stable across time. 
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Table 6 
 
Mean reaction times by block and condition in Experiment 2 
 
 
Condition 
            
  
 
Block  G + F  G + NF NG + F NG + NF Overall 
 
   
1  362 (38) 369 (52) 356 (47) 380 (52) 367 (48) 
2  364 (52) 388 (64) 377 (67) 393 (57) 380 (61) 
3  369 (49) 403 (74) 389 (84) 408 (62) 392 (70) 
4  367 (57) 410 (82) 391 (72) 417 (73) 399 (72) 
5  386 (78) 424 (100) 414 (90) 430 (74) 413 (62) 
Overall 372 (50) 399 (69) 385 (62) 405 (57) 390 (62) 
 
Note. G + F = goal + feedback, G + NF = goal + no feedback, NG + F = no goal + 
feedback, NG + NF = no goal + no feedback. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Table 7 
 
Reaction time variability by block and condition in Experiment 2 
 
 
Condition 
             
 
Block  G + F  G + NF  NG + F NG + NF Overall 
 
 
1  .17 (.07) .17 (.05) .16 (.06) .20 (.13) .17 (.08) 
2  .15 (.05) .18 (.07) .17 (.10) .18 (.09) .17 (.08) 
3  .16 (.12)  .19 (.09) .18 (.10) .21 (.13) .18 (.11) 
4  .17 (.09) .21 (.11) .20 (.12) .21 (.11) .19 (.11) 
5  .19 (.11) .23 (.16) .23 (.17) .20 (.14) .21 (.14) 
Overall .17 (.06) .20 (.07) .19 (.09) .20 (.08) .19 (.07) 
 
Note. G + F = goal + feedback, G + NF = goal + no feedback, NG + F = no goal + 
feedback, NG + NF = no goal + no feedback. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 
I also analyzed the distribution of RTs as a function of condition. As expected, 
there was a main effect of bin (F(4, 540) = 359.16, p < .001, partial η2 = .73). Although 
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goal-setting did not interact with bin (F(4, 540) = .86, p = .49, partial η2 = .01), feedback 
did (F(4, 540) = 2.56, p = .04, partial η2 = .02). There was no significant three-way 
interaction among bin, goal-setting, and feedback (F(4, 540) = .92, p = .45, partial η2 = 
.01). So the better performance for participants in the feedback conditions can be partially 
explained by a change in the RT distributions. Participants who received feedback 
reduced the skew of their RT distributions, as group differences became larger in the 
slower bins. Table 8 shows these data. 
Table 8 
 
Reaction time distributions in Experiment 2 
 
 
     Condition 
 
 
Bin  G + F  G + NF NG + F NG + NF 
 
 
1  306 (26) 315 (33) 309 (31) 320 (26)    
2  334 (36) 350 (45) 340 (41) 356 (34) 
3  358 (46) 378 (57) 365 (48) 386 (46) 
4  387 (58) 416 (75) 398 (62) 425 (61) 
5  474 (94) 536 (149) 512 (165) 542 (136) 
 
Note. G + F = goal + feedback, G + NF = goal + no feedback, NG + F = no goal + 
feedback, NG + NF = no goal + no feedback. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 A final analysis of RTs examined lapses (RTs > 500 ms). The analysis indicated a 
main effect of block (F(4, 540) = 27.79, p < .001, partial η2 = .17), such that lapses 
became more frequent across time (linear effect: F(1, 135) = 48.79, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.27), and an effect of feedback that was nearly significant (F(1, 135) = 3.76, p = .06, 
partial η2 = .03). So feedback also slightly reduced lapses in those conditions. Table 9 
shows these data. In summary, the between-subject manipulations had a few effects on 
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task performance: participants in the feedback conditions reduced the skew of their RT 
distributions and encountered fewer lapses, which led to faster RTs overall. However 
there was no evidence for an effect of goal-setting on task performance, nor an 
interaction between goal-setting and feedback. 
Table 9 
 
Lapses by block and condition in Experiment 2 
 
 
     Condition 
 
 
Block  G + F  G + NF NG + F NG + NF 
 
 
1  1.23 (1.68) 2.11 (3.44) 1.34 (2.21) 2.08 (3.41) 
2  1.69 (3.12) 3.11 (4.91) 2.06 (4.33) 2.71 (3.71) 
3  1.51 (2.64) 3.51 (5.12) 2.37 (3.90) 3.24 (3.53) 
4  2.37 (3.78) 3.86 (4.93) 2.80 (3.44) 4.00 (5.38) 
5  2.94 (3.85) 4.49 (6.20) 3.74 (4.69) 5.23 (5.73) 
 
Note. G + F = goal + feedback, G + NF = goal + no feedback, NG + F = no goal + 
feedback, NG + NF = no goal + no feedback. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Motivation and alertness ratings  
The analysis on alertness ratings indicated a effect of block on alertness ratings 
(F(4, 540) = 49.77, p < .001, partial η2 = .27) such that alertness ratings dropped across 
time (linear effect: F(1, 135) = 132.33, p < .001, partial η2 = .50). There were no main 
effects of goal-setting (F(1, 135) = .04, p = .85, partial η2 = .00) or feedback (F(1, 135) = 
1.17, p = .28, partial η2 = .01), and no goal-setting x feedback interaction (F(1, 135) = 
2.10, p = .15, partial η2 = .02). However, the effect of block did significantly interact with 
goal-setting (F(4, 540) = 2.52, p = .04, partial η2 = .02). There was no feedback x block 
interaction (F(4, 540) = .15, p = .96, partial η2 = .001), and no goal-setting x feedback x 
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block interaction (F(4, 540) = .15, p = .96, partial η2 = .001). Participants who were given 
the goal reported a slightly shallower drop in alertness ratings across time. Figure 11 
shows this pattern.  
 
Figure 11. Alertness ratings by block and goal-setting condition, collapsed across 
feedback conditions, in Experiment 2. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the 
mean. 
 
The analysis on motivation ratings indicated a main effect of block (F(4, 540) = 
53.54, p < .001, partial η2 = .28), such that motivation decreased across time (linear 
effect: F(1, 135) = 120.30, p < .001, partial η2 = .47). Although there were no main 
effects of goal-setting (F(1, 135) = 1.35, p = .25) or feedback (F(1, 135) = 1.75, p = .19), 
there was a small but significant goal-setting x feedback interaction (F(1, 135) = 4.06, p 
= .04, partial η2 = .03). Participants in the goal + feedback reported the highest levels of 
motivation, overall. There was no block x goal-setting interaction (F(4, 540) = 1.97, p = 
.10, partial η2 = .01), no block x feedback interaction (F(4, 540) = 1.56, p = .18, partial η2 
= .01), and no block x goal-setting x feedback interaction (F(4, 540) = .92, p = .45, partial 
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η2 = .01). Figure 12 shows the goal-setting x feedback interaction on average motivation 
ratings. 
 
Figure 12. Average motivation ratings by goal-setting and feedback conditions in 
Experiment 2. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Thought probe responses 
 I had hypothesized that participants in the goal-setting and feedback conditions 
would show reduced mind-wandering, and that goal-setting and feedback would interact, 
such that participants in the goal + feedback condition would report the least amount of 
mind-wandering. To specifically test these hypotheses, I submitted mind-wandering 
reports to a 2 x 2 x 2 x 5 mixed ANOVA with within-subjects factors of intentionality 
(intentional mind-wandering vs. unintentional mind-wandering) and block and between-
subjects factors of goal-setting and feedback. The analysis indicated a main effect of 
block (F(4, 540) = 17.30, p < .001, partial η2 = .11), such that mind-wandering increased 
across time (linear effect: F(1, 135) = 45.02, p < .001, partial η2 = .25), a main effect of 
intentionality (F(1, 135) = 206.06, p < .001, partial η2 = .60), such that participants 
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reported more unintentional mind-wandering than intentional mind-wandering, and a 
block x intentionality interaction (F(4, 540) = 6.55, p < .001, partial η2 = .05), such that 
unintentional mind-wandering increased at a faster rate than intentional mind-wandering. 
Simple effects analyses indicated that both unintentional mind-wandering (linear effect: 
F(1, 135) = 35.44, p < .001, partial η2 = .21) and intentional mind-wandering (linear 
effect: F(1, 135) = 4.00, p = .05, partial η2 = .03) increased across time, which replicates 
Experiment 1. The analysis also indicated a main effect of feedback (F(1, 135) = 5.92, p 
= .02, partial η2 = .04), such that participants in the feedback conditions reported less 
mind-wandering overall. However there was no main effect of goal-setting (F(1, 135) = 
2.79, p = .10, partial η2 = .02) nor a feedback x goal-setting interaction (F(1, 135) = 2.29, 
p = .13, partial η2 = .02). There was also no block x goal-setting (F(4, 540) = .74, p = .57, 
partial η2 = .01), block x feedback (F(4, 540) = .67, p = .61, partial η2 = .01), or block x 
goal-setting x feedback interaction (F(4, 540) = 1.59, p = .18, partial η2 = .01). Finally, 
there was no block x intentionality x goal-setting (F(4, 540) = .94, p = .44, partial η2 = 
.01) or block x intentionality x feedback interaction (F(4, 540) = .70, p = .60, partial η2 = 
.01). There was a small but significant block x intentionality x goal-setting x feedback 
interaction (F(4, 540) = 3.04, p = .02, partial η2 = .02, indicating the effects of time on the 
two types mind-wandering differed slightly across conditions. But overall, I found only 
partial evidence for my hypotheses. While people in the feedback conditions showed 
reduced mind-wandering overall, mind-wandering was unaffected by goal-setting. Figure 
13 shows these data. Data for all thought probe responses collapsed across blocks are 
listed in Table 10. 
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Figure 13. Mind-wandering reports as a function of intentionality and feedback condition 
in Experiment 2. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Table 10 
 
Thought probe response proportions in Experiment 2 
 
 
   Condition 
 
 
Response   G + F  G + NF NG + F NG + NF 
 
 
On-task   .23 (.20) .25 (.20) .22 (.21) .21 (.19) 
Task-related interference .39 (.18) .20 (.14) .27 (.20) .25 (.17) 
External distraction  .07 (.09) .07 (.08) .07 (.11) .08 (.09) 
Intentional MW  .02 (.05) .08 (.09) .05 (.07) .07 (.10) 
Unintentional MW  .22 (.18) .29 (.17) .30 (.19) .31 (.13) 
Mind-blanking  .06 (.10) .11 (.17) .11 (.12) .09 (.11) 
 
Note. G + F = goal + feedback, G + NF = goal + no feedback, NG + F = no goal + 
feedback, NG + NF = no goal + no feedback. MW = mind-wandering. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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Pupillometry  
 Similar to Experiment 1, I first analyzed pre-trial pupil diameter as a function of 
time and condition. The analysis on mean pre-trial pupil indicated a main effect of block 
(F(4, 536) = 22.26, p < .001, partial η2 = .14), such that pre-trial pupil diameter decreased 
across time (linear effect: F(1, 134) = 29.94, p < .001, partial η2 = .17). There was no 
main effect of goal-setting (F(1, 134) = .91, p = .34, partial η2 = .01) or feedback (F(1, 
134) = 1.20, p = .28, partial η2 = .01) and no goal-setting x feedback interaction (F(1, 
134) = .55, p = .46, partial η2 = .004). The effect of block did not interact with goal-
setting (F(4, 536) = .04, p = .99, partial η2 < .001) or feedback (F(4, 536) = .45, p = .76, 
partial η2 = .003), and there was no three-way interaction between block, goal-setting, 
and feedback (F(4, 536) = 1.46, p = .21, partial η2 = .01). So although arousal decreased 
across time, this effect did not differ across conditions. Figure 14 shows these results. 
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a) 
 
b) 
 
Figure 14. Pretrial pupil diameter as a function of block and feedback in the a) goal and 
b) no-goal conditions. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
 The analysis on pre-trial pupil variability indicated a main effect of block (F(4, 
536) = 22.34, p < .001, partial η2 = .14), such that pre-trial pupil variability increased 
across time (linear effect: F(1, 134) = 52.10, p < .001, partial η2 = .28). But similar to 
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mean pre-trial pupil diameter, there were no main effects of goal-setting (F(1, 134) = .11, 
p = .74, partial η2 = .001) or feedback (F(1, 134) = .82, p = .37, partial η2 = .01), and no 
goal-setting x feedback interaction (F(1, 134) = .14, p = .71, partial η2 = .001). Further, 
the effect of block did not interact with goal-setting (F(4, 536) = .38, p = .83, partial η2 = 
.003) or feedback (F(4, 536) = 1.30, p = .29, partial η2 = .01), and there was no three-way 
interaction among block, goal-setting, and feedback (F(4, 536) = 1.60, p = .17, partial η2 
= .01). So although arousal fluctuated more as time progressed, this effect did not differ 
across conditions. Figure 15 shows these data. 
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a)  
 
b)  
 
Figure 15. Pre-trial pupil variability for the feedback and no feedback conditions in the a) 
goal and b) no goal conditions. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
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 The next set of analyses focused on task-evoked pupil responses. Binning and 
baselining procedures were identical to Experiment 1. The task-evoked waveforms by 
block, collapsed across conditions, are depicted in Figure 16. Similar to Experiment 1, 
task-evoked responses decreased across blocks (F(4, 520) = 18.70, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.13). 
 
Figure 16. Task-evoked pupillary responses by block in Experiment 2. 
 To compare task-evoked responses across goal-setting and feedback conditions, I 
computed a peak dilation for each trial using the same method in Experiment 1 and 
averaged these values within blocks for each participant. The analysis on maximum 
dilations indicated a main effect of block (F(4, 536) = 28.16, p < .001, partial η2 = .17), 
such that maximum dilations decreased across time (linear effect: F(1, 134) = 83.13, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .38). There was no main effect goal-setting (F(1, 134) = .08, p = .78, 
partial η2 < .01), but there was a significant main effect of feedback (F(1, 134) = 11.62, p 
= .001, partial η2 = .08), such that participants in the feedback conditions showed greater 
task-evoked responses overall. Goal-setting and feedback did not significantly interact 
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(F(1, 134) = .001, p = .98, partial η2 < .001). There was no block x goal-setting 
interaction (F(4, 536) = .13, p = .97, partial η2 = .001), no block x feedback interaction 
(F(4, 536) = .91, p = .46, partial η2 = .01), and no three-way interaction among block, 
goal-setting, and feedback (F(4, 536) = 1.82, p = .12, partial η2 = .01). Figure 17 shows 
this pattern. Largely, the task-evoked responses corroborated the effects on task 
performance and mind-wandering. Participants in the feedback conditions showed faster 
RTs, less mind-wandering, and greater task-evoked pupillary responses, overall.  
 
  
56 
 
a) 
 
b)  
 
Figure 17. Average maximum task-evoked pupillary response by feedback condition for 
the a) goal and b) no-goal conditions. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the 
mean. 
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Post-experiment questionnaire 
 To see if the goal-setting manipulation “sunk in” with participants, I examined 
how often participants in each condition mentioned the specific goal of keeping their 
average RT below 300 ms. I first transcribed their hand-written responses verbatim, then 
coded whether or not the specific goal was mentioned. Whereas only 6% of participants 
in the goal + no feedback condition mentioned the goal in their post-experiment 
questionnaire, 47% of participants in the goal + feedback condition mentioned the goal. 
So at least subjectively, participants in the goal + feedback condition seemed to 
internalize the goal more than the participants in the goal + no feedback condition. 
However, this did not lead to significantly better behavioral performance for these 
participants. If anything, it increased their motivation, as evidenced by the goal-setting x 
feedback interaction on motivation ratings. But it produced no other significant 
differences. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 examined the effects of goal-setting, feedback, and their 
combination. In a 2 x 2 design, participants were given either a difficult goal or no goal, 
and trial-by-trial and block-by-block feedback or no feedback at all. I had hypothesized 
that feedback would benefit sustained attention, that goal-setting would benefit sustained 
attention, and together they would have an interactive effect. However, the only factor 
that had a significant effect on task performance, mind-wandering, and pupillary 
measures of effort was feedback. Participants who received trial-by-trial and block-by-
block feedback about their performance, regardless of whether or not they received the 
difficult goal instructions, showed faster RTs, fewer lapses, reductions in mind-
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wandering, and greater task-evoked pupillary responses. I did not find any strong 
evidence for an effect of goal-setting, similar to Experiment 1, nor did I observe evidence 
for interactive effects of goal-setting and feedback. In other words, the effect of feedback 
was not stronger for participants who received feedback about a specific goal. 
Interestingly, although participants in the feedback conditions showed the above-
mentioned effects, they did not report higher levels of motivation or alertness, and they 
did not show greater overall arousal, as measured by pre-trial pupil diameter. But 
collectively, the bulk of the evidence in Experiment 2 points to the idea that feedback has 
a facilitative effect on sustained attention.  
 All of the time-on-task effects from Experiment 1 replicated in Experiment 2. As 
time progressed, participants’ RTs increased and became more variable, they reported 
lower levels of motivation and alertness, they reported more mind-wandering, and the 
pupillary measures indicated decreases in arousal and effort. Interestingly, even 
participants in the feedback conditions, who showed improvements in sustained attention 
across a number of different metrics, still demonstrated these trends. So despite having a 
facilitative effect on sustained attention, feedback was not sufficient to eliminate the 
effects of time.  
 Although it is clear that feedback had a significant impact on performance in a 
number of ways, it is not clear whether this was due to the trial-by-trial or the block-by-
block feedback. As a reminder, the standard version of the PVT gives the participant their 
RT for 1 s following each trial. In the no-feedback conditions, this feedback screen was 
replaced by a visual mask (XX.XXX). Additionally, participants did not receive feedback 
as to how close they were to the goal, or how they were doing in general, and thus had no 
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idea how they could adjust their effort accordingly (but see Cross-Experimental 
Analyses). 
 The lack of an effect of goal-setting may be due to some of the same factors as 
Experiment 1. First, there was no incentive to reach the goal. So similar to Experiment 1, 
participants may have decided that the effort required to reach the goal was not worth it. 
Second, the goal may have been too difficult. Indeed, only one participant in Experiment 
2 actually kept their average RT below 300 ms. So again, participants may have adjusted 
their personal goals downward in the face of the difficulty of reaching the goal.  
 In regards to the goal-setting framework, in this case feedback was a necessary 
and sufficient means of improving sustained attention. Without feedback, the difficult 
goal did not have any significant effects on the dependent variables. But without a goal, 
feedback still had a significant effect on several dependent variables including task 
performance, mind-wandering, and pupillary indicators of effort. These results are 
inconsistent with Erez’s (1977) argument that feedback is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
aspect of goal-setting. But they are also inconsistent with goal-setting theory’s argument 
(Locke & Latham, 2002) that feedback is simply a moderator of the effect of goals. In 
this case, feedback did not need to be paired with a goal to be effective. These results are 
most consistent with those of Warm et al. (1974), who found that feedback reduced 
vigilance decrements in reaction times and reaction time variability, even when the 
feedback was false. However, Warm et al. argued that the primary mechanism by which 
feedback effected performance was via motivation. And in Experiment 2, there was no 
main effect of feedback on motivation. Rather, there was a feedback x goal-setting 
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interaction. Feedback only produced a significant change in motivation when it was 
paired with a specific goal.  
 In regards to the resource, mindlessness, and motivational control theories of 
vigilance and sustained attention, the results again did not unequivocally support one 
theory. Some results, like the decreases in alertness, arousal, and unintentional mind-
wandering across time, are consistent with predictions made by resource theories of 
vigilance and sustained attention. However, participants also reported decreases in 
motivation and intentional mind-wandering across time. These results are inconsistent 
with resource theories, but are rather consistent with mindlessness theories. The majority 
of the evidence is consistent with the motivational control and resource-control theories. 
Clearly, participants were making downward adjustments in effort across time, as 
reflected by both self-reports of motivation and task-evoked pupillary responses. Also, 
some participants in both the goal and no-goal conditions explicitly reported changes in 
their goals across time. For example, one participant in the no-goal + feedback condition 
said, “At first I wanted to see how fast I could react to the changing numbers. I wanted to 
be as fast as I could. That desire waned as the task progressed and I got tired/sore.” One 
participant in the goal + no feedback condition said, “[My goal was] to do as instructed to 
the best of my ability, pressing the button as soon as possible. My resolve to accomplish 
this goal gradually ebbed.” However other participants in the goal conditions reported 
their goal was to get their average below 300 ms throughout the task. These different 
types of reactions – continual goal activation in the face of and downward adjustments of 
goal standards – are both predicted by the motivational control theory.  
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 However, some results are inconsistent with this account. Specifically, the 
motivation control theory argues that the adaptive response to a downward adjustment in 
goals prevents mental fatigue, as people prevent themselves from the consistent strain 
toward a demanding task goal. This would predict that people who abandoned the 
difficult goal in favor of some easier or more general goal would not show as much of an 
effect of time on alertness and arousal. In other words, participants who did not report 
trying to maintain the goal of keeping their average reaction time below 300 ms should 
report greater alertness than participants who strained to pursue that goal throughout the 
task. But this was not the case, as they showed roughly equal overall alertness (t(67) = 
1.15, p = .26), and they did not show different patterns of alertness across time (F(4, 268) 
= .36, p = .84, partial η2 = .01). 
 With regard to the resource-control theory, many of the predictions made by the 
theory are supported: changes in task performance were accompanied by decreases in 
motivation and increases in mind-wandering across time. Further, feedback increased 
task engagement via reduced mind-wandering. However, the increase in task engagement 
did not eliminate or even mitigate the vigilance decrement. Although participants showed 
an overall improvement in task performance when given feedback, the feedback 
conditions showed roughly the same downward trend in performance as the no-feedback 
conditions, as there was no block x feedback interaction. Further, similar to Experiment 
1, the pattern of intentional and unintentional mind-wandering across time is the opposite 
of what would be predicted by the resource-control theory. Unintentional mind-
wandering increased at a significantly faster rate than intentional mind-wandering across 
time.  
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT 3: GOAL-SETTING AND INCENTIVES 
 Although prior research has shown that the simple act of setting a specific, 
difficult goal is sufficient to improve performance, incentives have been shown to 
magnify or enhance the effect of goals (Locke & Bryan, 1966; Locke & Latham, 2002). 
Specifically, the incentives produce greater goal commitment among individuals. So 
Experiment 3 examined how incentives moderate the effect of goals. The task 
parameters, set-up, and design were nearly identical to those in Experiments 1 and 2. But 
in Experiment 3, there were three conditions with incentive manipulated between 
conditions. In each condition, participants were told that their goal would be to keep their 
average reaction time below 300 ms. The incentive for meeting this goal differed across 
conditions. In the cash-incentive condition, participants were told that they would receive 
$10 if they met the goal. In the time-incentive condition, participants were told that the 
experimental session would last 1 hr. But if they met the performance goal after 30 min, 
they would be released from the experiment early. In the no-incentive condition, 
participants were given no incentive to meet the goal. I hypothesized that the incentives 
would enhance the effect of the difficult goal. The conditions also offered the opportunity 
to compare the efficacy of a time-based incentive versus a monetary incentive. Although 
several studies have successfully mitigated sustained attention deficits using monetary 
incentives (Berghum & Lehr, 1964; Bevan & Turner, 1965; Esterman et al., 2016; 
Massar et al., 2016; Smith, Lucaccini, & Epstein, 1967), and several have used time-
based incentives (Esterman et al., 2014; Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b; Seli et al., in 
press). Only one study, to my knowledge, has directly compared these two incentives 
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(Esterman et al., 2014), and they did not find any differences in performance across 
monetary and time incentive conditions. 
 In regards to the proposed framework, incentives should theoretically moderate 
the effect of goals on task engagement via goal commitment (see Figure 18). In a goal-
setting situation, such as those in Experiment 1, the goal is set by the experimenter, and 
there is no particular reason for the participant to meet that goal, other than being 
instructed to do so and some social desirability norm (e.g., wanting to seem competent), 
the participant has no external incentive. Therefore, an incentive might increase goal 
commitment, which in turn would affect task engagement and task performance (Mowen, 
Middlemist, & Luther, 1981). To measure this directly, I will also ask participants to 
report their current level of goal commitment throughout the task, in addition to their 
motivation and alertness.  
 
Figure 18. Theoretical framework for how incentives might moderate the effect of goals. 
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Method 
Participants and procedure 
 A sample of 118 participants from the human subjects pool at the University of 
Oregon completed the study in exchange for partial course credit. Participants first 
completed informed consent and demographics forms. Participants were randomly 
assigned to an incentive condition. Six participants indicated on the post-experimental 
questionnaire that they had heard about the study, one participant felt sick and had to take 
a break in the middle of the experiment, so these participants were replaced. The final 
sample included 111 participants (no-incentive condition: N = 37; time incentive 
condition: N = 36; cash incentive condition: N = 38; M age = 19.39, 68 females, 42 
males, 1 non-binary gender). 
 PVT. The task was identical to that used in Experiments 1 and 2, and the 
feedback screens between blocks were identical to those used in the goal + feedback 
condition of Experiment 2. Participants in all conditions completed 5 blocks of 28 trials. 
 Goal instructions and incentives. All participants were recruited to the lab under 
the impression that the experimental session would last 1 hour, and that they would 
receive 1 course credit for their participation. In all three conditions, participants were 
told, “Previous research suggests that good performance on this task is a reaction time 
below 300 milliseconds. Therefore, your goal on this task will be to keep your average 
reaction time below 300 milliseconds. After each block of trials, you will see a screen 
with your average reaction time for that block, your average reaction time overall, and 
how your performance compares to your goal.” The no-incentive condition was identical 
to the goal + feedback condition in Experiment 1, with the exception that questions about 
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goal commitment were included. In the time-incentive condition, participants were told, 
“This task will take 1 hour. At the midway point of the task, if you have met the goal 
(i.e., kept your average reaction time below 300 ms), you will be allowed to stop the 
experiment early and leave the session. You will still receive 1 credit for participating 
today. If you have not met the goal, you will continue the task for another 30 minutes.” In 
the monetary incentive condition, participants were told, “At the end of the task, if you 
have met the goal (i.e., kept your average reaction time below 300 ms), you will receive a 
$10 cash bonus in addition to 1 credit for your participation. If you have not met the goal, 
you will only receive course credit.” All participants who kept their average reaction time 
below 300 ms were given the $10 bonus, regardless of condition, and all participants 
were released from the experiment after 30 min, regardless of performance, and given 
course credit for 1 hour of participation. 
 Self-reports. In addition to the motivation and alertness questions, participants 
were asked to report their current level of goal commitment on a 7-point scale (1 = not 
committed at all, 7 = totally committed) at the end of each block. 
 Thought probes. See Experiment 1. 
 Post-experiment questionnaire. See Experiment 1. 
Results 
RTs 
 Trimming and averaging procedures were identical to Experiments 1 and 2. Table 
11 shows average RTs by block and condition. Unless otherwise noted, for all subsequent 
analyses I analyzed the data with 5 x 3 mixed ANOVAs with a within-subjects factor of 
block and a between-subjects factor of condition. The analysis on mean RTs indicated a 
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main effect of block (F(4, 432) = 21.19, p < .001, partial η2 = .16), such that RTs 
increased across time (linear effect: F(1, 108) = 29.39, p < .001, partial η2 = .21). 
However there was no main effect of condition (F(2, 108) = .22, p = .80, partial η2 = 
.004), and there was no block x condition interaction (F(8, 432) = .59, p = .78, partial η2 
= .01). So providing participants with an incentive to meet a difficult goal did not 
improve performance beyond providing that goal alone, and it did not eliminate the effect 
of time on RTs.  
Table 11 
 
Mean reaction times by block and condition in Experiment 3 
 
 
Condition 
 
 
Block No incentive  Time incentive Cash incentive Overall 
 
 
1   345 (45)  348 (42)  346 (39)  346 (38)  
2   346 (43)  346 (44)  359 (44)  351 (44) 
3   360 (55)  364 (65)  367 (51)  364 (57) 
4   375 (76)  366 (56)  376 (58)  372 (63) 
5   378 (90)  374 (88)  388 (63)  380 (80) 
Overall  360 (54)  360 (54)  367 (46)  362 (51) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 Table 12 shows RT variability data by block and condition. The analysis on RT 
variability indicated a main effect of block F(4, 432) = 4.34, p = .002, partial η2 = .04), 
such that RTs became more variable across time (linear effect: F(1, 108) = 12.81, p = 
.001, partial η2 = .11). However there was no main effect of condition (F(2, 108) = .15, p 
= .86, partial η2 = .003), and no block x condition interaction (F(8, 432) = .64, p = .74, 
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partial η2 = .01). So overall, participants’ RTs became more variable across time. But this 
effect did not differ based on the incentive provided to meet a difficult goal. 
Table 12 
 
Reaction time variability in each block and condition in Experiment 3 
 
 
Condition 
 
 
Block No incentive  Time incentive Cash incentive Overall 
 
 
1   .16 (.08)  .17 (.08)  .15 (.06)  .16 (.07) 
2   .15 (.09)  .16 (.09)  .19 (.13)  .17 (.11) 
3   .19 (.13)  .17 (.10)  .18 (.13)  .18 (.12) 
4   .20 (.11)  .19 (.11)  .20 (.11)  .20 (.11) 
5   .19 (.12)  .19 (.16)  .21 (.14)  .20 (.14) 
Overall  .18 (.08)  .18 (.08)  .19 (.09)  .18 (.08) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 As two final steps, I also analyzed RTs by their distribution and the occurrence of 
lapses. Table 13 shows reaction times by bin and condition, and Table 14 shows the 
number of lapses per block by condition. A 5 x 3 mixed ANOVA with a within-subjects 
factor of bin and a between-subjects factor of condition indicated a main effect of bin 
(F(4, 432) = 220.87, p < .001, partial η2 = .67). But there was no bin x condition 
interaction (F(4, 432) = .04, p = .99, partial η2 = .001). So there was no evidence for a 
difference in the distribution of RTs across conditions. Finally, the analysis on lapses 
indicated a maid effect of block (F(4, 432) = 13.61, p < .001, partial η2 = .11), such that 
lapses became more common across time (linear effect: F(1, 108) = 24.77, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .19). But there was no main effect of condition on lapses (F(2, 108) = .19, p = 
.82, partial η2 = .004), and the effect of block did not interact with condition (F(4, 432) = 
68 
 
1.18, p = .31, partial η2 = .02). Collectively, the analyses on RTs all come to the same 
conclusion: providing an incentive to meet a difficult goal did not significantly alter 
performance on the task over and above simply providing the goal. Providing the goal 
without an incentive produced similar task performance to giving this goal and offering a 
reward for meeting it. 
Table 13 
 
Reaction time distributions in each condition in Experiment 3 
 
 
Condition 
 
 
Bin No incentive  Time incentive Cash incentive Overall 
 
 
1 295 (22)  293 (20)  299 (22)  296 (21)  
2 320 (30)  320 (29)  325 (29)  322 (29) 
3 342 (38)  342 (39)  348 (37)  348 (37) 
4 373 (57)  372 (55)  380 (49)  380 (49) 
5 473 (145)  471 (138)  484 (108)  476 (130) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 14 
 
Lapses in each block and condition in Experiment 3 
 
 
Condition 
 
 
Block   No incentive  Time incentive Cash incentive Overall 
 
 
1     .84 (1.24)  1.36 (2.49)  1.08 (2.13)  1.09 (2.01) 
2   1.05 (2.05)  1.19 (1.97)  1.26 (1.81)  1.17 (1.93) 
3   1.59 (2.68)  1.75 (3.12)  1.61 (2.22)  1.65 (2.67) 
4   2.30 (3.55)  1.75 (2.45)  2.50 (3.53)  2.18 (3.22) 
5   2.22 (3.42)  2.03 (3.07)  2.97 (3.26)  2.41 (3.25) 
Overall  1.60 (2.23)  1.62 (2.27)  1.88 (2.18)  1.70 (2.21) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Motivation and alertness ratings 
 Figures 19 and 20 show mean alertness and motivation ratings, respectively, by 
block and condition. The analysis on alertness ratings indicated a main effect of block 
(F(4, 432) = 27.13, p < .001, partial η2 = .20), such that alertness decreased across time 
(linear effect: F(1, 108) = 62.01, p < .001, partial η2 = .37). There was also a significant 
main effect of condition (F(2, 108) = 4.87, p = .009, partial η2 = .08). However there was 
no significant interaction between condition and block (F(2, 108) = 1.32, p = .27, partial 
η2 = .02). Participants in the time incentive condition reported significantly higher 
alertness ratings overall compared to the no-incentive condition (t(71) = 2.05, p = .04) 
and compared to the cash incentive condition (t(72) = 3.06, p = .003). However, there 
was no significant difference in overall alertness ratings between the no-incentive and the 
cash incentive conditions (t(73) = .89, p = .37). Only the difference between the cash 
incentive and time incentive conditions is significant after correcting for multiple 
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comparisons. So although there was no difference in the pattern of changes in alertness 
across time between conditions, participants in the time incentive condition reported 
higher alertness, overall. 
The analysis on motivation ratings corroborated the alertness reports. There was a 
main effect of block on motivation ratings (F(4, 432) = 31.66, p < .001, partial η2 = .23), 
such that motivation decreased across time (linear effect: F(1, 108) = 65.78, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .38), and a significant main effect of condition (F(2, 108) = 4.41, p = .01, 
partial η2 = .08), but no interaction between block and condition (F(2, 108) = .52, p = .60, 
partial η2 = .01). Similar to the alertness ratings, participants in the time-incentive 
condition reported higher motivation ratings overall compared to the cash-incentive 
condition (t(72) = 2.93, p = .005) and the no-incentive condition (t(71) = 2.09, p = .04), 
with no difference between the cash incentive and no-incentive conditions (t(73) = .86, p 
= .39). Again, only the difference between the time incentive and cash incentive 
conditions was significant after correcting for multiple comparisons. Figure 14 shows this 
pattern. Interestingly, although they did not show superior task performance, participants 
in the time-incentive condition reported higher overall alertness and motivation than 
participants in the cash-incentive condition, and participants in the cash-incentive 
condition reported the lowest levels of motivation. 
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Figure 19. Alertness ratings by block for each condition in Experiment 3. Error bars 
represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 20. Motivation ratings by block for each condition in Experiment 3. Error bars 
represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Goal commitment 
 Due to a programming error, the goal commitment responses were not recorded 
for participants in the no-incentive condition. So unfortunately, I was unable to examine 
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the effect of incentives on goal commitment compared to a no-incentive condition. 
However, these responses were successfully recorded for the cash incentive and time 
incentive conditions. I submitted these responses to a 2 x 5 mixed ANOVA with a 
between-subjects factor of condition and a within-subjects factor of block. The ANOVA 
indicated a main effect of block (F(4, 288) = 33.48, p < .001, partial η2 = .32), such that 
goal commitment decreased across time (linear effect: F(1, 72) = 81.74, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .53), and a significant effect of condition (F(1, 72) = 8.42, p = .005, partial η2 = .11), 
but no block x condition interaction (F(4, 288) = 1.34, p = .26, partial η2 = .02). Figure 21 
shows this pattern. Similar to the findings with motivation and alertness ratings, 
participants in the time incentive condition reported significantly greater commitment 
toward the goal than participants in the cash incentive condition.  
 
Figure 21. Goal commitment by block in the time-incentive and cash-incentive 
conditions in Experiment 3. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Thought probe responses 
 I had hypothesized that another result incentives would be a reduction in mind-
wandering by participants in the incentive conditions. To test this hypothesis, I examined 
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mind-wandering reports across time for each condition. I submitted responses to a 2 x 5 x 
3 mixed ANOVA with within-subjects factors of intentionality (intentional, 
unintentional) and block and a between-subjects factor of condition. The analysis 
indicated a main effect of block (F(4, 432) = 12.22, p < .001, partial η2 = .10), such that 
mind-wandering increased across time (linear effect: F(1, 108) = 37.54, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .26), and a main effect of intentionality (F(1, 108) = 80.15, p < .001, partial η2 = . 
43), such that participants reported more unintentional mind-wandering than intentional 
mind-wandering. Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, there was no block x intentionality 
interaction (F(4, 432) = 1.75, p = .14, partial η2 = .02). But simple effects analysis 
indicated that both intentional mind-wandering (F(1, 110) = 10.44, p = .002, partial η2 = 
.09) and unintentional mind-wandering (F(1, 110) = 19.70, p < .001, partial η2 = .15) 
increased linearly across time. Finally, there was no significant main effect of condition 
(F(2, 108) = .63, p = .53, partial η2 = .01), no block x condition interaction (F(8, 432) = 
.82, p = .59, partial η2 = .02), and no block x condition x intentionality (F(8, 432) = .42, p 
= .91, partial η2 = .01). The effects of block and intentionality depicted in Figure 22. 
Proportions for all thought probe responses, collapsed across block, are listed in Table 15. 
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Figure 22. Intentional and unintentional mind-wandering across blocks, collapsed across 
conditions, in Experiment 3. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Table 15 
 
Thought probe response proportions in Experiment 2 
 
 
   Condition 
 
 
Response   No incentive  Time incentive Cash incentive 
 
 
On-task   .21 (.17)  .21 (.22)  .18 (.16) 
Task-related interference .31 (.18)  .38 (.21)  .38 (.19) 
External distraction  .08 (.12)  .05 (.08)  .09 (.15) 
Intentional MW  .06 (.11)  .05 (.07)  .05 (.08) 
Unintentional MW  .27 (.25)  .24 (.16)  .23 (.17) 
Mind-blanking  .08 (.14)  .08 (.16)  .06 (.10) 
 
Note. MW = mind-wandering. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Pupillometry 
 The analysis on mean pre-trial pupil diameter indicated a significant main effect 
of block (F(4, 424) = 19.19, p < .001, partial η2 = .15), such that pre-trial pupil diameter 
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decreased across time (linear effect: F(1, 106) = 25.00, p < .001, partial η2 = .19). But 
there was no significant effect of condition (F(2, 106) = .66, p = .52, partial η2 = .01), and 
the block x condition interaction was not quite significant (F(8, 424) = 1.91, p = .06, 
partial η2 = .04). Figure 23 depicts these data. 
 
Figure 23. Pre-trial pupil diameter across blocks for each condition in Experiment 3. 
Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
 The analysis on pre-trial pupil variability indicated a significant main effect of 
block (F(4, 424) = 6.35, p < .001, partial η2 = .06), such that pre-trial pupil showed more 
variability across time (linear effect: F(1, 106) = 16.12, p < .001, partial η2 = .13). 
However the effect of condition was not quite significant (F(2, 106) = 2.83, p = .06, 
partial η2 = .05), and there was no block by condition interaction (F(8, 424) = .55, p = 
.82, partial η2 = .01). Figure 24 shows these data.  
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Figure 24. Pre-trial pupil variability across blocks for each condition in Experiment 3. 
Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
 The next set of analyses focused on task-evoked pupillary responses. Binning and 
baseline-correction procedures are identical to Experiments 1 and 2. Similar to 
Experiments 1 and 2, task-evoked pupillary responses decreased across time (F(4, 412) = 
5.85, p < .001, partial η2 = .05). The waveforms are shown in Figure 25. The waveforms 
and the effect of block on these waveforms are largely consistent with Experiments 1 and 
2. 
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Figure 25. Task-evoked pupillary responses by block in Experiment 3. Error bars 
represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
 To examine the effects of incentives on task-evoked responses, I computed an 
average peak dilation by taking the peak dilation on each trial within the window from 
500 to 800 ms post stimulus onset. Although there was a significant main effect of block 
on maximum dilations (F(4, 424) = 10.38, p < .001, partial η2 = .09), such that maximum 
dilations decreased across time (linear effect: F(1, 206) = 24.96, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.19), there was no main effect of condition (F(2, 106) = 1.09, p = .34, partial η2 = .02), 
and no block x condition interaction (F(8, 424) = 1.33, p = .23, partial η2 = .02). Figure 
26 shows this pattern. 
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Figure 26. Maximum task-evoked pupillary responses by block and condition in 
Experiment 3. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Post-experiment questionnaires 
 Just as in Experiments 1 and 2, I recorded participants’ responses to the post-
experiment questionnaire to see how often people directly mentioned the goal of keeping 
their average RT below 300 ms. A total of 59% of people in the no-incentive condition, 
75% in the time incentive condition, and 68% in the cash incentive condition specifically 
reported the experimental goal. So the majority of participants in every condition 
appeared to adhere to the goal set forth at the beginning of the task. However, some 
individuals reported an adjustment in their goal during the task, and this is something I 
will address in the General Discussion. 
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Discussion 
 Experiment 3 examined the combination of goal-setting, feedback, and incentives. 
The no-incentive condition in Experiment 3 was identical to the goal + feedback 
condition in Experiment 2. In the time-incentive condition, participants received the 
incentive of early release from the experiment for meeting the goal. In the cash-incentive 
condition, participants received the incentive of a monetary bonus. Interestingly, the 
groups performed about equally on the task, they reported similar amounts of mind-
wandering, and the pupillometric indicators of arousal and task-based effort did not differ 
across the three conditions. The only significant effects of condition were on alertness 
and motivation ratings. Participants in the time-incentive condition reported higher 
overall alertness and greater overall motivation than participants in the other conditions. 
Somewhat surprisingly, participants in the cash-incentive condition reported the lowest 
overall motivation and alertness ratings. And even very early in the task, participants in 
the cash-incentive condition showed the lowest motivation (see Figure 14). Finally, 
participants in the time-incentive condition reported greater goal commitment than 
participants in the cash-incentive condition. However, participants in both conditions 
reported decreases in goal commitment across time. 
 There are several reasons why the incentives did not impact sustained attention 
and mind-wandering in the hypothesized ways. First, similar to Experiments 1 and 2, the 
goal may have been too difficult. Participants in the cash-incentive and time-incentive 
condition both reported decreases in goal commitment across time, similar to the 
consistently observed effects of time on motivation and alertness. So even when given a 
considerable incentive to meet a difficult goal, participants still reported waning 
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motivation, alertness, and commitment to the goal across time. However, it is possible 
that some participants did indeed maintain motivation and commitment to the goal across 
the duration of the task, whereas others “quit” on the goal at some point during the task 
when they realized it was unlikely they would actually reach it. Then, when averaging 
across such people across within a condition, we observe a linear decrease in motivation 
and commitment across time. A second possible reason is that the motivation incentive 
was not sufficient to convince participants to maintain their motivation and commitment 
to the goal for the entire task duration. Perhaps $10, or a potential early release from the 
experiment, is not enough to convince people to fully commit to a task goal. However, it 
is still unclear why the cash incentive would produce lower motivation among 
participants than no incentive at all. This is a surprising finding that begs replication 
before it can be adequately interpreted. Future research can address how the magnitude of 
such incentives interacts with goal-setting manipulations. A third possible reason is the 
incentive structure. In the present experiment, the incentive was awarded in an all-or-
nothing manner. So again, if participants made a metacognitive judgment that the goal 
(and thus the incentive) was out of reach, they could have adjusted their effort level 
downward. In future research, I can address whether different incentive structures interact 
with goal-setting. For example, if participants were rewarded based on how close they 
got to the goal, rather than in a binary all-or-nothing manner, this may encourage 
participants to pursue the goal with more consistency. A final possibility, which would be 
predicted by a resource theory of sustained attention, is that people truly cannot sustain 
their attention because of resource depletion. No matter how you incentivize them, set 
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goals for them, or provide them with feedback, you cannot offset the inevitable 
decrements in performance across time. 
 Just as in Experiments 1 and 2, none of the theories of sustained attention and 
vigilance can account for all of the results. Again, the consistent downward trends in 
arousal and alertness would be predicted by resource theories, as would the increase in 
unintentional mind-wandering. However, the decreases in motivation and goal 
commitment across time are inconsistent with resource theories, which argue that people 
continually exert attention across the length of a task, but resource depletion prevents 
them from doing so effectively. The increase in intentional mind-wandering and decrease 
in motivation would indeed be predicted by mindlessness theories, which argue that 
simple tasks induce boredom and voluntary disengagement. But mindlessness theory 
predicts that changes would be entirely volitional, and this is clearly not the case. Finally, 
the motivational control theory can account for many of the results, as some participants 
are clearly adjusting their goals and effort in response to the demands of the task, as 
reflected by decreases in goal commitment across time. However, a motivational 
incentive should increase the desire of participants to actively maintain a goal. The fact 
that participants in the cash-incentive condition expressed even lower motivation than 
participants in the no-incentive condition is problematic for this view. Finally, with 
regard to the resource-control theory, the lack of an effect of an incentive goes against at 
least one of the predictions made by the theory. Providing an incentive should reduce 
mind-wandering – especially intentional mind-wandering – as participants have more to 
gain from active maintenance of the task goal as opposed to allocating resources to mind-
wandering. Again, although unintentional mind-wandering did not increase at a 
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significantly greater rate than intentional mind-wandering in Experiment 3, it was not the 
case that intentional mind-wandering increased at a faster rate than unintentional mind-
wandering, as resource-control theory would predict. It is still possible that even very 
early on participants recognized the difficulty of meeting the goal and thus the incentive 
had little to no bearing on their decision to pursue the goal. Again, this is an area for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER V 
CROSS-EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSES 
 Comparing certain conditions across experiments, I can test several outstanding 
questions. First, the no-feedback conditions in Experiment 2 removed both trial-by-trial 
and block-by-block feedback. However, in that particular experiment, it was impossible 
to specifically examine whether the trial-by-trial or block-by-block feedback facilitated 
participants. Essentially, the no-goal condition in Experiment 1 and the no-goal + 
feedback condition in Experiment 2 differed only in one respect: the presence or absence 
of trial-by-trial feedback. Participants in Experiment 1 received trial-by-trial feedback, 
whereas participants in Experiment 2 received no feedback at all. Their goal was the 
same. By directly comparing these conditions, we can assess whether the presence of the 
trial-by-trial feedback has an effect on the dependent variables. If there is a difference 
between these conditions in any respect, then the trial-by-trial feedback may be driving 
some of the effects of feedback in Experiment 2. If there are no differences between these 
conditions, then the block-by-block feedback is driving the effect. Specifically comparing 
these conditions did not indicate any significant differences in task performance, 
subjective reports of alertness and motivation, mind-wandering, or pupillary data. This 
suggests the beneficial effect of feedback was likely not due to the presence of trial-by-
trial feedback but due to the block-by-block feedback.  
 Another comparison that allows us to directly test the effect of block-by-block 
feedback is by comparing the hard goal condition in Experiment 1 to the goal + feedback 
condition in Experiment 2. The sole difference between these conditions is that 
participants in Experiment 2 received both trial-by-trial and block-by-block feedback, 
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whereas participants in Experiment 1 only received trial-by-trial feedback. Their goal was 
the same. Compared to Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 reported higher 
motivation (t(68) = 2.41, p = .02), less intentional mind-wandering (t(68) = 2.71, p = .01), 
and greater task-evoked pupillary responses overall (t(68) = 2.20, p = .03). So both 
comparisons across experiments come to the same conclusion: the presence of block-by-
block feedback, rather than trial-by-trial feedback, led to greater effort, motivation, and 
task engagement. 
 Another open question which can be addressed via cross-experimental analyses is 
whether or not the lack of an effect of the time or cash incentives over the no-incentive 
group in Experiment 3 is due to abnormally good performance by the no-incentive group. 
The no-incentive condition in Experiment 3 and the goal + feedback condition in 
Experiment 2 are virtually identical. They received the same goal and feedback structure. 
If these two conditions show roughly the same patterns of task performance, self-reports, 
and pupillometry, then I can rule out the possibility that the no-incentive participants in 
Experiment 3 were an abnormally high-performing group, thus masking the effects of 
incentives. Participants in Experiment 2 reported greater motivation overall (t(70) = 2.16, 
p = .04), and slightly but not significantly less intentional mind-wandering (t(70) = -1.92, 
p = .06). But no other differences were significant, and in fact all of the differences just 
mentioned were in the opposite direction than would be worrisome for Experiment 3. 
Therefore, it does not appear to be the case that the no-incentive participants in 
Experiment 3 were not simply an abnormally engaged and high-performing group of 
participants.   
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CHAPTER VI 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The goal of the present set of experiments was to evaluate how goals, feedback, 
and incentives might regulate sustained attention via several theoretical mechanisms. In 
Figure 1, I outlined a framework for how goal-setting might moderate sustained attention 
via four potential mechanisms: arousal/effort, mind-wandering, motivation, and alertness. 
This framework is informed by goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 2002), 
motivational control theory (Hockey, 2011), depletion theories of sustained attention 
(Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008), mindlessness accounts of sustained attention 
(Robertson et al., 1997; Manly et al., 1999), and resource-control accounts of sustained 
attention (Thomson et al., 2015). The experiments were designed not only to examine 
potential ways to improve sustained attention, but to test predictions made by competing 
accounts of sustained attention. 
 In Experiment 1, I manipulated goal-setting, and more specifically goal-
specificity and goal-difficulty, across conditions. In one condition, participants were 
given standard instructions to try to respond as quickly as possible on each trial of a 
simple reaction time task (PVT). In the hard-goal condition, participants were instructed 
to try to keep their average reaction time below 300 ms. In an easy-goal condition, 
participants were instructed to try to keep their average reaction time below 800 ms. In 
prior research with this exact task, average reaction times were around 350 ms, and only 
about 10% of participants had an average reaction time below 300 ms. Therefore, we 
chose 300 ms as our performance standard for the hard-goal condition to be difficult but 
not impossible to reach. The easy goal was a rather trivially low standard to reach, but 
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would allow us to rule out the possibility that any specific goal, regardless of difficulty, 
might affect sustained attention. Based on goal-setting theory, I had hypothesized that 
giving participants a specific, difficult goal would improve task performance, either by 
shortening reaction times or making them less variable, increase subjective motivation 
and alertness, reduce the frequency of mind-wandering, and increase physiological 
indicators of arousal and effort (i.e., pre-trial and task-evoked pupil diameter), relative to 
giving participants a vague goal or an easy goal. However, the goal-setting manipulation 
did not produce the hypothesized effects. Participants in all three conditions showed 
typical effects of time on sustained attention (i.e., vigilance decrements). With time, 
reaction times became longer and more variable, participants reported decreases in 
motivation and alertness, participants reported mind-wandering – intentionally and 
unintentionally – more often, and pupillary indicators of arousal and effort decreased. But 
I found very little evidence that the goal-setting manipulation affected sustained attention 
in the hypothesized ways. Participants who were given a specific, difficult goal had better 
task performance (i.e., faster overall RTs) than participants in the no-goal condition and 
slightly fewer lapses (i.e., RTs > 500 ms), but roughly the same patterns of mind-
wandering, subjective states of motivation and alertness, and pupillary measurements of 
effort and arousal as participants who were given a specific, easy goal and participants 
who were given a non-specific goal of just responding as quickly as possible.  
 In Experiment 2, I manipulated the presence of feedback in combination with 
goal-setting in a 2 x 2 design with goal-setting and feedback fully-crossed across 
conditions. In the 2 goal-setting conditions, participants received the difficult goal from 
Experiment 1 – try to keep average reaction time below 300 ms. In the no-goal 
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conditions, participants were given the standard instructions to try to respond as quickly 
as possible on each trial. In the feedback conditions, participants were given their average 
reaction time for the previous block, as well as their average reaction time for the task 
overall. In the no-feedback conditions, participants were not given such information 
between blocks. I also removed the trial-by-trial performance feedback, which in the 
standard version of the task gives the participant their reaction time for 1 s on each trial. 
This screen was replaced with a visual mask. Based on goal-setting theory and previous 
research utilizing feedback, I hypothesized that feedback would improve performance, 
increase motivation and alertness, reduce mind-wandering, and increase physiological 
indicators of arousal and effort. I also hypothesized that feedback and goal-setting would 
interact. That is, I expected the effect of feedback to be greater when this feedback was 
tethered to a specific goal, rather than simply provided to the participants in the absence 
of any specific goal. However, the results only provided strong evidence in favor of a 
global effect of feedback. Regardless of goal-setting condition, participants who received 
performance feedback showed faster reaction times – especially due to a reduction in 
extremely slow reaction times, reported fewer instances of both intentional and 
unintentional mind-wandering, and greater task-evoked pupillary responses, which 
presumably indicate greater effort. Other than for subjective motivation ratings, I did not 
observe any evidence for an interaction between goal-setting and feedback.  
 An open question regarding feedback was whether the effect was due to the trial-
by-trial or block-by-block feedback. By comparing conditions across Experiments 1 and 
2, it became clear that the block-by-block rather than trial-by-trial feedback was 
responsible for the effects observed in Experiment 2. By giving participants periodic 
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information about their performance, and thus an idea of how their performance was 
changing across time, the feedback kept participants more effortfully engaged in the task. 
But this effect was evident for participants whose performance was being compared 
against a specific standard and for participants whose performance was not specifically 
tied to a standard. 
 Experiment 3 examined one additional potential moderator of goal-setting on 
sustained attention: motivational incentives. Perhaps, in Experiments 1 and 2 participants 
in the goal conditions felt relatively uncommitted to the performance standard set for 
them by the experimenter because there was no reward offered for meeting such a goal, 
or penalty for not meeting the goal. So in Experiment 3, I compared performance in a 
condition with a goal, but no reward for reaching that goal (no-incentive condition), to 
two incentive conditions in which participants were told they would receive either a $10 
cash bonus (cash-incentive condition), or early release from the experiment (time-
incentive condition). I had hypothesized, based on prior experiments offering rewards for 
good performance on sustained attention tasks (Massar et al., 2016; Seli et al., 2015), that 
participants in the incentive conditions would outperform participants in the no-incentive 
condition. Although participants in the time-incentive condition reported greater 
alertness, motivation, and goal-commitment than participants in the other conditions, 
there were no differences across conditions in task performance, mind-wandering, or 
pupillary indicators of arousal and effort. So I did not replicate prior studies using 
incentives (Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Massar et al., 2016; Seli et al., in 
press).  
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Limitations 
 The present study had several limitations worth noting. First, with the exception 
of the effects of time within a session, some of the observed effects (e.g., the main effect 
of feedback on reaction times) were quite small. And further, some effects that were in 
the hypothesized directions (e.g., the interaction between goal-setting and feedback on 
reaction times), were small but non-significant. Tt is possible that some of the 
hypothesized effects exist, but require quite large sample sizes to detect. So one of the 
limitations of the current set of experiments could have been the sample size, given the 
between-subjects design. Ways to increase power could be to increase the sample sizes of 
the between-subjects design or to use a within-subjects design with a sample size similar 
to the present study. However, as with any within-subjects design, the experimental 
manipulations would be subject to ordering effects. Finally, if the effects are indeed very 
small, one has to begin to wonder how theoretically meaningful they truly are. This is an 
area for future research. 
 A second limitation of the current study is that the hard-goal conditions set a quite 
stringent threshold. I had based the standard (average reaction time < 300 ms) on the idea 
that 10% of people might hit the difficult goal without specifying it from prior research 
(Unsworth & Robison, 2016). A possible limitation is that the goal was too stringent a 
standard for many participants. Indeed, few participants met this goal. In Experiment 1, 
only 1 of the 35 participants who were given the difficult goal actually achieved it. In 
Experiment 2, only 1 of the 70 participants who were given the difficult goal achieved it. 
And only 7 of the 111 participants in Experiment 3 achieved the goal. So clearly it was 
not an impossible goal to reach, but its difficulty may have discouraged some 
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participants. Indeed, some participants specifically noted that they adjusted their goal 
based on the fact that they did not think they would be able to keep their average reaction 
time below 300 ms. For example, one participant said, “300 [ms] was not gonna (sic) 
happen, so somewhere closer to 400 [ms] was the goal I was thinking about at some 
point.” Another participant said, “[My goal was] to get at least 350 [ms] for my average 
reaction time. 300 [ms] was too hard to achieve for me it seemed like.” This downward 
adjustment in goals is specifically predicted by the motivational control theory of mental 
fatigue (Hockey, 2011). Because the goal was so difficult, many participants found 
themselves not meeting the goal, and many adapted by adjusting their goal, adjusting 
their effort, or both. Certainly, participants were experiencing mental fatigue. Self-
reported alertness dropped, unintentional mind-wandering increased, and arousal 
decreased. But the data also suggested that some decrements in performance across time 
were due to voluntary adjustments of effort. Intentional mind-wandering increased, self-
reported motivation decreased, and pupillary measures of effort decreased across time. 
Whereas many people appear to be continually activating and pursuing the experimental 
goal, a substantial number of participants also seem to be, and indeed directly report, 
making adjustments to this goal to reduce mental strain.  
 A third limitation, which is most relevant to Experiment 3, is the combination of 
the goal, the feedback, and the incentive structure. Prior incentivizing studies on 
sustained attention used a rather vague performance goal to motivate participants (e.g., 
Seli et al., in press), only after the participants had already been completing the task for a 
period of time (Hopstaken et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2016), or used different incentive 
structures than the present study (Brewer et al., 2017; Massar et al., 2016). In Seli et al.’s 
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(in press) study, participants expecting a 1-hr study were told they could leave the 
experiment early if after 30 min they had “achieved a certain level of performance” on 
the task (Seli et al., in press, P.3). All participants were released after 30 min. So in this 
particular study, the performance goal was quite vague. In the Hopstaken et al. (2015a, 
2015b, 2016) studies, participants completed several blocks of a 2-back task for about 90 
min. Before the last block of the task, participants were told that the remaining time in the 
experiment depended on their performance on the upcoming block, relative to their 
previous performance. They were told the remaining time would vary from 5 to 40 min. 
In reality, all participants were released after the next block (5 min later). Again, this goal 
was quite vague. In the Esterman et al. (2014, 2016) studies, participants were told that 
the reward (time or money) would be given based on their accuracy on the task. 
However, no specific accuracy threshold was set, and incentive structure was given. So in 
none of these cases did participants have any idea was the specific standard was that they 
needed to meet. And in the Hopstaken et al. studies, the goal wasn’t introduced until 
relatively late in the experimental session. In the Massar et al. (2016) study, participants 
were rewarded for every reaction time below their median reaction time, which was 
measured during an introductory block of trials. So in this study, the performance goal 
was specific, but it was much less difficult to meet, and the reward was not granted in an 
all-or-nothing manner. Finally, in Brewer et al. (2017), participants were paired into 
dyads and told whomever had the fewest reaction times below 500 milliseconds would 
receive a $10 gift card, which was placed on the desk between them. This manipulation 
introduced a competitive component, as well as some ambiguity as to how exactly they 
were performing compared to their competitor. These subtle differences in task 
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parameters may be important, and future research can address which factors might 
moderate the effect of incentives. Interestingly, participants in the cash-incentive 
condition reported the lowest motivation and alertness, overall. It is not entirely clear 
why offering a monetary incentive would lead participants to report being even less 
motivated than participants who were offered no incentive at all.  
 Another possible reason for the lack of an effect of an incentive in Experiment 3 
was the reward structure. As mentioned in the Discussion for Experiment 3, the incentive 
was offered in an all-or-nothing manner. Thus, perhaps even very early on, participants 
may have developed an impression of how likely it would be that they would actually 
earn the incentive. The interaction between goal-difficulty and incentive structure has 
been directly investigated in previous research. For example, Mowen et al. (1981) had 
participants complete math problems for 40 minutes. Three goal levels were manipulated 
across conditions: an easy goal (solve 30 problems), a moderate goal (solve 55 
problems), and a difficult goal (solve 95 problems). They also manipulated incentive 
structure across conditions. In the piece-rate condition, participants were paid based on 
how many problems they answered correctly during the 40 min, regardless of their goal. 
In the bonus system, participants were paid a monetary bonus only if they reached their 
specific goal, with additional payments made for every problem solved correctly beyond 
the goal. Goal-difficulty and incentive significantly interacted such that participants 
answered the most math problems with an easy or moderate goal in the bonus incentive 
conditions, whereas participants answered the most problems with a difficult goal in the 
piece-rate incentive conditions. Thus, the incentive actually appeared to de-motivate 
participants if it was given in an all-or-nothing manner. This effect may have occurred in 
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the present study. When participants realized they probably would not meet the goal, the 
incentive may have discouraged them to a point where they actually became de-
motivated. In fact, this may account for why participants in the cash-incentive condition 
expressed lower motivation than participants in the no-incentive condition. In future 
research, I plan to manipulate incentive structures across goal conditions to examine 
whether the interaction that Mowen et al. (1981) observed replicates in sustained 
attention tasks. 
Future Directions 
 In the future, I plan to follow up on the present set of experiments by addressing 
several remaining questions. To address the question of whether the difficult goal used in 
the present study was in fact too difficult to be a motivational force, I plan on completing 
a follow-up experiment in which goal-difficulty is parametrically manipulated between 
conditions. In one condition, participants will receive the difficult goal used in the present 
study (average reaction time < 300 ms). In another condition, participants will receive a 
moderately difficult goal (average reaction time below 375 ms). In both the hard-goal 
condition of Experiment 1 and the goal + feedback condition of Experiment 2, more than 
half of participants kept their average reaction time below this threshold. In a third 
condition, participants will have an easily attainable goal of keeping their average 
reaction time below 600 ms. All participants in the no-goal condition of Experiment 1, all 
but 1 participant in Experiment 2, and all participants in Experiment 3 kept their average 
reaction time below this threshold. If the moderate-goal condition produces better task 
performance, engagement, and motivation than the hard-goal condition, this would 
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suggest that the hard goal does indeed induce some “quitting” among participants, which 
leads to downward adjustments in effort, motivation, and task-engagement.  
 A second future step will be to examine the interactions between goals and 
incentive structure. My first step will be to re-run Experiment 3, but with a different 
incentive structure. Rather than being told that they would be compensated monetarily if 
and only if they meet the goal, participants will be told they will be compensated based 
on how close they get to the set goal. For example, they will get $10 if they keep their 
average reaction time below 500 ms. Then, for every additional ms below 500, they will 
get a $0.10 bonus. A second step would be to see how all-or-nothing incentive structures 
interact with goal-difficulty. As mentioned earlier, Mowen et al. (1981) showed that goal-
difficulty and incentive structures interact such that a piece-rate incentive structure is best 
when paired with a difficult goal, whereas an all-or-nothing incentive structure is best 
when paired with an easy goal. So by combining incentive structures and goals within 
sustained attention, we may be able to identify optimal conditions for task engagement. 
Another step would be to try to more directly replicate other experiments that have used 
incentives in combination with the PVT (Brewer et al., 2017; Massar et al., 2016). These 
experiments will give further insight into how people adjust their effort and engagement 
in a task given the tradeoffs they perceive between continual effort and partial 
disengagement. 
 A third future step will be to further investigate the subjective nature of sustained 
attention deficits. The present set of experiments attempted to quantify and objectify 
adjustments in motivation, affect, arousal, and effort. However there are still some 
unanswered questions. For example, do people realize that sustained attention and 
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vigilance decrements are occurring, especially in the absence of feedback? Are the shifts 
toward intentional mind-wandering because people are bored with the task and are 
looking for some escape? Or, do they feel overwhelmed by the demands of the task and 
disengage as a coping mechanism? What individual differences (e.g., conscientiousness, 
cognitive ability) might moderate subjective responses to difficult sustained attention 
situations? One pathway for answering these questions could be structured interviews 
with participants following the task. Some of the best insights into how participants 
perceived the goal, their likelihood of meeting the goal, and their reactions to these 
conditions came from the post-experimental questionnaires. Further questioning of 
participants might reveal insights into the nature of sustained attention that are masked by 
our inability to quantify and codify certain affective and subjective responses. 
Conclusion 
 Across 3 experiments, I did not find any conclusive evidence that setting difficult 
goals for people, even combined with incentives to meet these goals, reduces mind-
wandering and improves sustained attention. However, I did find rather consistent 
evidence that providing feedback about performance throughout a sustained attention task 
kept people more engaged and motivated, improved their performance, and reduced 
mind-wandering. I attributed the lack of an effect of a difficult goal on sustained attention 
to the goal being too difficult, thus creating a situation where the demands of the task 
exceeded the ability of most participants to meet such a goal. This created a situation in 
which many participants adjusted their goals and effort level downward to some lower or 
more general performance standard. This interpretation is driven by consistent downward 
trends in motivation, increases in intentional mind-wandering, decreases in task-evoked 
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pupillary responses, and decreases in goal-commitment. The extension of feedback 
effects on mind-wandering, the investigation of various levels of goal-difficulty, and the 
investigation of various incentive structures in combination with goals are necessary 
areas of future research into sustained attention.  
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